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ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether the Utah Uniform Mediation Act should in fact govern. 
II. How the Utah Uniform Mediation Act affects the questions raised in this 
appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES, & REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lb-1, et seq. - Addendum 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-101 et seq. -- Addendum 2 
Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2003, 
Sections 3 and 6 - Addendum 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal involves an attorney, Ms. Acosta, who entered into a binding 
agreement with Respondent Craig Reese on behalf of her client, Petitioner LWP. 
LWP now denies having entered into this agreement, and has attempted to use 
various confidentiality provisions, including the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, to 
suppress evidence of the agreement. 
The Act should not govern this issue because Craig Reese and LWP never 
agreed to mediate, and their separate agreement was reached outside of the 
mediation context. 
By its express provision, the Act applies only to "agreements to mediate 
whenever made." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-114(2). While the parties to the 
original lawsuit, Craig Reese and Tingey, created a written record of an agreement 
to mediate, no such record exists between Craig Reese and LWP, who never had 
1 
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an agreement to mediate. Mr. Dunn, counsel for LWP, essentially admitted this at 
oral argument before this Court. 
Nevertheless, a separate agreement between Craig Reese and LWP was 
reached, apart from the mediation. Mr. Felt did not act as a mediator in this 
separate agreement, nor did Tingey participate. Therefore the agreement falls 
outside of the Act's definition of mediation, which is "a process in which a 
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them 
in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
31c-102(1). Mr. Felt did not facilitate this agreement, it was not part of the subject 
matter of the mediation, and LWP was an interested spectator, not a party to the 
mediation dispute. Instead, the agreement was a separate agreement which Craig 
Reese relied upon to settle its mediation dispute with Tingey. 
Despite the foregoing, if the Court finds that the Utah Uniform Mediation 
Act does apply to this issue, at least four exceptions in the Act also apply which 
would allow for disclosure of the relevant information. Since Craig Reese has not 
yet had the opportunity to introduce evidence supporting these exceptions and the 
existence of an agreement, this Court should remand to the district court to make 
these determinations. 
First, the broad exception test in § 7 8-3 lc-106(2) allows disclosure when a 
court determines at a hearing that the evidence is not otherwise available, the need 
for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in confidentiality, and the 
evidence is offered in a proceeding regarding a contract arising out of the 
9 
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mediation. Each of these three factors is met here. The only way to obtain this 
evidence is through the testimony and affidavits of those present at the mediation. 
There is also a need to uphold public policy favoring settlements, avoiding unjust 
results, and obtaining reliable evidence which substantially outweighs the interest 
in confidentiality in this case, especially considering that only a narrow range of 
communications (those regarding the existence and terms of an agreement) need to 
be disclosed. Where, as here, a party has relied upon a binding agreement to settle 
its differences with another party, confidentiality must give way to allow evidence 
of that agreement. Finally, the evidence is argued in a motion to enforce a binding 
contract. Therefore this exception applies. 
Second, § 78-31-107(2)(a) provides that a mediator may disclose "whether 
a settlement was reached." Further, a mediator may testify as to any mediation 
communications under the broad exception test mentioned above, which applies 
here. This Section would thus permit mediator testimony here concerning the 
existence of an agreement as well as its terms. 
Third, the parties to the case, Craig Reese and Tingey, have already agreed 
to disclose information concerning the settlement agreements, which under § 78-
31c-108 the parties have discretion to do. The parties have also been careful not to 
disclose confidential information regarding liability, dollar amounts, or other 
similarly privileged matters discussed in the mediation. 
Fourth, under § 78-3 lc-105(2) LWP has already effectively waived its 
confidentiality privileges concerning the agreement with Craig Reese in its 
3 
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arguments and affidavits attempting to "rebut" Craig Reese's recitations of the 
facts in this case. Craig Reese will be prejudiced if LWP is allowed to disclose its 
own version of events and invoke the confidentiality privilege to block Craig 
Reese from responding to its claims. 
In sum, this Court should affirm the district court's order allowing the 
deposition of Ms. Acosta and remand to allow Craig Reese to introduce further 
evidence, including affidavits and testimony of those present at the mediation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT SHOULD NOT GOVERN 
HERE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE 
BETWEEN CRAIG REESE AND LWP, AND BECAUSE THE 
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN CRAIG REESE AND LWP WAS A 
SEPARATE AGREEMENT, 
A. There Was No "Agreement to Mediate" Between Craig Reese 
and LWP, Which Is Required for the Act to Apply. 
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act ("the Act") should not govern here due to 
there being no agreement to mediate between Craig Reese and LWP. As of May 
1, 2007, the Act "governs all agreements to mediate whenever made." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31c-l 14(2). 
Section 78-3lc-103 of the Act, discussing the Act's "scope," provides some 
insight into the definition of an "agreement to mediate." The section provides that 
the Act applies when "the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a 
record that demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be 
privileged against disclosure" (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-
4 
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103(l)(hl I i«iii" Ku MI .iiiiull 1 iif]f.n*v sn'iinl i mil l ! il liiiiii.il a^icnih ml hold i 
mediation conference on December 30, 2005, to promote amicable relations and 
avoid litigation costs, 'jm* ujLicloa lurmally agreed in a record to mediate. R55; 
R66 <•* I 
There is no record of an agreement to mediate with LWP, however. Ms. 
Acosta was present representing LWP as a lien holder. She was merely invited to 
the mediation. di «::: • t : h z i si lbi ogation intei < settlement proceeds and 
nothing more. This interest was not in any wa} . I lit.1 I;msml P " I'h*• 
mediation would have proceeded without her, as she had no obligation to be 
present. 
LWP ha s never aiip-dod 11 ml iiil: \ \ as pai I: of an agi eement tc mediate in 1:1: lis 
case, and il i,s ioo lair (n» do so now The Comment to the original U niforni 
Mediation Act states thai "|a| laier note by one party that they agreed to mediate 
w Mild ii<nil lonsiiluU1 a in'inml oi an ,if»rtviiinil In mediate. ,. inn 
Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2UUJ, 9 (^ 
http://wwwdaw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf). 
Iliiili; "Ill, i .'Iin1'inin ipirslioik'd aliMiil (Jus icquiremeiit l)y tins ( "oiuil at oral 
w.^xxxuit on May 2, 200 7, Mr. Dunn, Counsel ioi i_ ^ : essentially 
there had been no agreement to mediate between LWP ami Craig Reese. Oral 
Argument R ecording, Reese v Tinnw .
 4. , <li;- (available at 
http://ww wjilioiifis guvA» <: ''..;,•.: - ^), 
5 
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B. The Agreement Between Craig Reese and LWP Was a Separate 
and Isolated Agreement Relied Upon by Craig Reese to Settle the 
Lawsuit Between Craig Reese and Tingey. 
Another reason the Utah Uniform Mediation Act does not apply here is that 
the agreement between LWP and Craig Reese was an agreement separate and 
isolated from the mediation. Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lc-103(1) provides that 
the Act "applies to a mediation . . ." (emphasis added). Mediation is defined as "a 
process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between 
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lc-102(l). 
Although LWP was present during the mediation, usually in the same room 
as Craig Reese, its agreement with Craig Reese was not part of the dispute 
between Craig Reese and Tingey regarding liability or other issues in the lawsuit. 
Mr. Felt, the mediator, only mediated the agreement between the parties; he did 
not facilitate the agreement between Craig Reese and LWP, though he did make 
one phone call to LWP representatives to explain the mediation between Craig 
Reese and Tingey. R55-57; R70; R77-78. LWP's only interest in the outcome of 
the suit was its statutory subrogation interest in the amount received in settlement. 
R55. 
This subrogation interest was settled prior to and separate from the 
agreement of the two parties to the mediation. There was no actual legal dispute 
between Craig Reese and LWP, but an undisputed statutory lien requirement. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). The reason Craig Reese invited LWP was to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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t a k e • :: a re c I I V "rI ''s lien •* - \ 
paymen t of all Craig Reese ' s wiv " j " anu immedia te medica l expenses and 
compensa t ion in return for the immedia te payment of their full net lien and full 
st/Kleiiiefil. V i (>K, H HI ' I  1 ni^u'y ,s al loiiK^s, a l though the separate agreement 
a l lowed Craig Reese to accept their set t lement offei , were not in any way in ( • oh e d 
in the agreement with I W P . R77-78 . The agreement with I ,'W'P was therefore 
comple te ly distinct from the mediat ion itself. ., •. 
media t ion . In its own words , L W P was merely an "Interested specta tor" in the 
case, R 2 1 3 . Further, its discussions wi th Craig Reese were not part of the actual 
Cra ig Reese and L W P is thus necessari ly separate from the proceedings of the 
media t ion and is not governed by the Act . 
Also , as previously discussed in Respondent' ' 's Brief on this issue, the Utah 
reasons . See Brief of Respondent Mur lyn Craig Reese , 19-22. T h e A D R Act 
defines media t ion as "a private forum in wh ich one or more impart ial persons 
(jnli l i t l i : miminimt .limn In (v-crn fMilics In »n r n i ! n Ii 11 In pininuh m iiiiiliiall 
acceptable resolut ion or set t lement ." "Utah Code Ann . § 78-31b-2v8, . Ao 
ment ioned , the mediator , M r Felt, was not involved in facilitating communica te •• 
I tdwecii i "i;iij.» U rest: and I! \ \ T RVi "n ", l>! Ml", U /" \ini \ u x e Craig Rec^c an., 
L W P "part ies to a civil act ion" as retpiiiTil in \hv A i i« -M l I iiii t l i n , 1111:: i r v n l m < r 
7 
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was not offered and would never be necessary to offer "at any subsequent trial of 
the same case or same issues between the same parties." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
31b-8(2). 
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE UTAH UNIFORM 
MEDIATION ACT DOES GOVERN, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION AND REMAND, BECAUSE THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE IS SUBJECT TO MANY 
EXCEPTIONS. 
There are many exceptions to the confidentiality privilege of the Act, many 
of which apply here and would allow disclosure of information necessary to 
establish an agreement between Craig Reese and LWP. If this Court does apply 
the Utah Uniform Mediation Act to this case, it should affirm the district court's 
order and remand to allow Craig Reese to introduce evidence to determine whether 
these exceptions apply. At the time the parties created their Motion to Enforce, the 
Act did not apply, and so the parties did not have a chance to introduce evidence to 
meet these exceptions. 
Further, the Motion to Enforce was not fully argued before the district court 
due to the interlocutory appeal to this Court. Therefore, this Court must remand so 
Craig Reese may introduce evidence such as Ms. Acosta's deposition, the 
testimony of Mr. Henriksen's secretary, and subsequent affidavits. R213, May 22, 
2006 Hearing Transcript, 39-40. 
Though the facts of Lyons v. Booker do not apply here, the principle that an 
appeals court "does not hear or consider new evidence" applies to this Court as 
well as other appeals courts. 1999 UT App 172, f 2, 982 P.2d 1143. The district 
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under the evidence already introduced, there is moi \lu:\ ^uliicient likelihood that 
these exceptions are met here, as will be shown... hii.s < ourt should therefore, if it 
drtH'fiinies iilillijil llin Ai, I ill»|>1K\->. allnm the dislrul iiiiiitl s oidci .inil n maud In 
allow Craig Reese to offer further evidence to establish these exceptions to 
confidentiality under the Act as well as the existence of an agreement with LWP. 
A. The Confidentiality Privilege liues INot Apply Where the 
Evidence is Not Otherwise Available, There Is a Need to 
Introduce the Evidence Which Substantially Outweighs the 
Privilege, and. the Evidence Is Offered in a Proceeding to 
Enforce a Contract. 
A broad excepik... ->
 UJi ^vWiiiuaiihihu pn *•..£. known, as the "exception 
test,"1 is state rah Code '> ; 
"There - -.onlidentialiivi privilege • * *»*irt, administrative 
agenc} o< arbitrate finds ;nic? \ hearing !•- ^ amera, that the party 
seeking discover} *'i ihc pioponent« ' evidence has shown that: 
(a) the evidence is not otherwise .. jhi, 
(b) there is a need for the evidence that s 1111 s 1.111 (i a 11)' u 111 w e i ^  11i 1111 • 
interest in protecting confidentiality; and 
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
(ii) , a proceeding to prove a claim 10 rescind 01 reforn. * 
defense to avoid ' i ^ or \ *i nat msin« ^ui ^' 
mediation."2. 
Because the validity of a settlement agreement is a vital issue, (he drat Ins ! llic 
Uniform Mediation Act included this exception test, which is "broader" than otliei 
1
 See Lelir v. Afflilo, 889 A 2d 462, 475 (NJ. Super, Ct App Div. 2006). 
2 if this t e s t j S met5 § 78 3 | c . jo 7(2)(j») provides Ihul a mediator may also 
testify concerning these communications. 
9 
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exceptions, to allow evidence establishing such an agreement. Uniform Mediation 
Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and Comments, 2003, 33. Each of the 
factors of the exception test applies here, and the Court should thus remand to 
allow this evidence. 
1. The evidence of an agreement with LWP is not available 
except through the testimony and affidavits Craig Reese 
seeks to introduce. 
Evidence of the binding agreement between LWP and Craig Reese is only 
available through the testimony or affidavits of those who were present during the 
formulation of the agreement. Mr. Felt prepared a written memorandum of 
understanding which encompassed this separate agreement as well as the 
mediation agreement between Craig Reese and Tingey, but Ms. Acosta refused to 
sign it. R59;R71-72;R78. 
Since Ms. Acosta, after earlier assenting to the agreement, did not sign the 
written memorandum of understanding, further evidence is required to establish 
that she had unequivocally agreed to the agreement before attempting to back out 
of it. R59; R71-72; R78. This evidence is only available through those persons 
who witnessed her assent to this agreement, and through her own deposition. 
2. There is a strong need for the evidence of the existence of 
the agreement that in this circumstance substantially 
outweighs the interest in confidentiality. 
There is a strong need for evidence here which substantially outweighs the 
confidentiality interest. The Comment to the original Uniform Mediation Act 
recognizes this need, stating that "confidentiality agreements reached in mediation, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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p'.ihh p b , vuiisideratioiib. Uniform Mediation AU, 1 uiui Yersiutt,, \\*..~ 
Prefatory Nou/ and Comments, 2003, 27, 
Ihe settlement agreement lien. IKIVULII I Wil"" iiiiii I "I MIJJ Reese slimikl In 
enforced fc i p: i it lie policj reasons fm coring settlement, reliable evidence, and 
performance of contractual duties. These reasons need to be balanced against the 
interest in confidentiality rather than being supplanted b) ' it. , • . 
the validity of a settlement agreement was at issue, This Court should use the 
reasoning applied by the court in Sharon Motor Lodge Inc. v. Tai, a recent case in,.. 
v hich a pai t) assented to a mediation agn - « 
t j i e agreement's existence. 2006 WL 696320 (Conn. 5upci. d , = ( - ^ attached a^  
Addendum. 4). 
In Shai on Motoi Lodge, the pai tie .s disagreed on the existence of a 
S l i . - • 
determination, which wab granted, and tlien a motion w alkm Uv Jepovhon o* 
mediator. The defendant opposed the motion on. the grounds of confidentiality 
in! ,il l J" 'i Hit i ii i i i i liiftinii In the < nnnu hu l l ( i rnn . i l Slaluli's \\ liiu'li MIHII.IIII1 
a r l e x c epj- |0 I 1 strikingly similar to the exception test. See C . G . S J L § 52-
235d(b)(4) 3 In fact, the court in its holding referenced the I Jniform,.. Mediation 
3
" Fhe Connecticut statute provides that a "par li it in a me liati ::: n shall 
not voluntarily disclose or, through discovery or comj rv nrocess, be i eqi lire d 
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Act's exception test itself, noting that it was analogous to its own statute. Sharon 
Motor Lodge, 2006 WL 696320, at *9. 
The Sharon Motor Lodge court found that the exception did apply, because 
"it is arguable that the plaintiffs have a substantial need to elicit testimony of the 
mediator in order to obtain evidence," and it was apparent that "evidence regarding 
. . . this issue is not available from other, unprivileged sources." Id. at *10. Thus 
the court ruled that "[i]n these circumstances, the interest of justice outweighs the 
need for confidentiality." M a t * 11. 
In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., the issue was whether to allow 
testimony from a mediator to determine the enforceability of an agreement. 68 F. 
Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D. Cal. 1999). The court considered, among other policy 
concerns, the interest in "doing justice," or in other words, "improving] the 
court's ability to determine reliability what the pertinent historical facts actually 
were." Id. at 1136. The court also considered that the testimony "would provide 
the court with the evidentiary confidence it needs to enforce the agreement," while 
refusing to admit the testimony "might well deprive the court of the evidentiary 
confidence it needs to enforce the agreement." Id. at 1137. The court thus 
concluded that the importance of these policy concerns outweighed the interest in 
confidentiality and allowed the mediator to testify. Id. 
circumstances in which a court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need 
for confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law" (emphasis added). 
10 
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Commentators have also agreed that the contract principles of reliance and 
settlement should be taken into account when deciding a novel issue like the one in 
the instant case. This position is taken by Peter Robinson in a recent journal article 
regarding the Uniform Mediation Act. Centuries of Contract Common Law Can yt 
Be All Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in 
Enforcement Proceedings Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. 
Resol. 135, 171. 
Robinson notes that failure to respect contract law and instead requiring 
strict confidentiality in all communications, as LWP suggests this Court do, will 
lead to "absurd enforcement results." Id. at 142. Examples cited by Robinson 
include cases in which a party used fraud or duress during mediation settlement, or 
agreed to terms and then later changed them, and then relied on the confidentiality 
of mediation communications to suppress evidence of its improper behavior. Id. at 
143-48. 
Robinson praises the Act for being an "improvement for strict mediation 
confidentiality jurisdictions because it explicitly acknowledges that, at times, 
mediation confidentiality must defer." Id. at 168. Concerning the exception test, 
he also notes that "while some commentators have expressed concern about [the 
requirement that the need for the evidence substantially outweigh the interest in 
confidentiality], it should not be problematic in the context of enforcing a settled 
case . . . Courts have already noted that the interest in protecting mediation 
13 
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confidentiality is diminished in the context of enforcing a mediated agreement." 
M a t 168-69. 
In the instant case it is clear that public policy principles are applicable, and 
that the same principles discussed by commentators and the Olam and Sharon 
Motor Lodge courts are implicated. Craig Reese relied heavily on the agreement 
with LWP to settle his lawsuit with Tingey. R57. With evidence allowing the 
parties to enforce this agreement, this long and costly litigation will come to an 
end with the parties settling out of court. Without the evidence, both parties will 
be back to square one. More importantly, LWP will be allowed to back out of an 
agreement to which it had already bound itself, which would be an absurd and 
unjust result, as well as a gross disregard of contract principles. 
Likewise, as the court discussed in Olam, allowing evidence of this 
agreement will further the interest in allowing a court to do justice and have 
evidentiary confidence in making its determination. It is vital to know what the 
facts actually were regarding the agreement between Craig Reese and LWP, and 
the only way for the district court to know is to admit evidence of the settlement's 
existence. Failure to do so would hinder the ability of the court to confidently 
make a correct determination on the issue. 
Balancing the needs for disclosure of evidence of this settlement agreement 
against the need for confidentiality, it is clear that the balance in this case should 
fall on the side of disclosure. The only evidence required to be disclosed here is of 
a non-confidential nature, establishing the existence of an agreement and its 
1 > f 
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essential terms. This information will not affect the liability or credibility of 
parties to the lawsuit. The lawsuit will be highly affected, however, if LWP is 
allowed to block evidence of its agreement with Craig Reese. Public policy should 
prevail and this agreement should be enforced if Craig Reese introduces evidence 
to the district court supporting its existence. 
3. The parties are seeking to enforce a separate contract 
made at the mediation via their Joint Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, which LWP is opposing. 
This issue arises out of a Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
filed by Craig Reese and Tingey, and so involves a binding contract on which 
LWP is trying to avoid liability. Karen Hobbs, a well-known Utah mediator, noted 
in a recent article that § 106(2)(c)(ii) would contemplate this exact situation. 
Mediation Confidentiality and Enforceable Settlements: Deal or No Deal?, Utah 
Bar Journal, May/June 2007, 40. Further, the Comment to the original Uniform 
Mediation Act itself states: "This exception [test] . . . is broader in that it would 
permit the admissibility of other mediation communications that are necessary to 
establish or refute a defense to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement" 
(emphasis added). Uniform Mediation Act, Final Version, with Prefatory Note and 
Comments, 2003, 33. 
4. The instant case is unique and presents a stronger basis 
for applying the exception test than cases in other 
jurisdictions which have applied the Act 
Since the Uniform Mediation Act is relatively new, there are very few cases 
from any jurisdictions discussing exceptions to confidentiality under the Act. In 
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the case that have dealt with these exceptions, none presented evidence that gave a 
good basis for the exceptions to apply. Those cases are thus distinguishable from 
the instant case, where there is a strong basis for applying the exception test. 
In Lehr v. Afflito, the parties met with a mediator who after the mediation 
wrote a letter of understanding to the parties' counsel setting forth in detail the 
issues resolved at the mediation. 889 A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006). The lower court allowed this testimony from the mediator, but the 
appellate court reversed, using the Uniform Mediation Act as a guiding principle. 
Id. at 472-74. The court found that the need for the mediator's testimony did not 
outweigh the confidentiality interest under the exception test, and was therefore 
impermissible. Id. at 475. 
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Lehr. In Lehr, the mediator's 
testimony was not vital because "it was clear and undisputed that an agreement 
had not been reached as to all issues." Id. There had been several financial issues 
unresolved in the mediation. Id. Further, Lehr was a divorce case, and "financial 
issues in a matrimonial case are, by their nature, interrelated." Id. The fact that 
several financial issues remained unresolved, therefore, was clear evidence that no 
agreement was reached. Also, the mediator's testimony went beyond just 
establishing the existence of an agreement; it mentioned details of the settlement 
between the parties. Id. at 464. 
Here, however, it is clear that the settlement between Craig Reese and LWP 
was an agreement on all issues when taken in conjunction with the settlement 
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between Craig Reese and Tingey. R56-57; R70; R77-78. Further, no testimony 
would be needed here regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit, only relating to 
an agreement between Craig Reese and LWP. This is therefore a much stronger 
case under the exception test than Lehr. 
Another easily distinguishable case is Adessa v. Adessa, another instance 
where mediator testimony was not permitted. 919 A.2d 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007). In Adessa a trial judge compelled a mediator to testify regarding a 
property settlement agreement reached in mediation. The appellate court reversed 
this order. Id. 
The instant case provides a much stronger argument for the exception test 
than Adessa. First, the mediation agreement in Adessa between the parties 
specifically provided that neither party was to depose or subpoena the mediator. 
Id. at 890-91. Second, the trial judge had compelled, not just allowed, the 
mediator's testimony, which is strictly prohibited by the Uniform Mediation Act in 
such a circumstance. Id. at 891; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-31c-106(3). 
Here, in contrast, the mediator is not being compelled to testify, and most of 
the evidence Craig Reese sought to introduce was not mediator testimony 
anyway—it was the depositions and testimony of others. Therefore, Adessa does 
not govern the instant case. 
The instant case presents a unique set of circumstances where the interest of 
justice must prevail. While the Uniform Mediation Act's exception test discussed 
in Lehr and Adessa is the test used here, the facts here differ significantly from the 
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facts in those cases. The situation here is most like the one in Sharon Motor 
Lodge, where the court used a similar exception under its own statute to permit the 
introduction of evidence relating to a mediation settlement agreement. The unique 
facts here meet the requirements of the exception test, and under the Uniform 
Mediation Act this Court should therefore affirm and remand the issue for the 
lower court to hold a hearing to rule on the exception test as it applies to these 
facts. 
B. The Act Provides that Mediators May Testify Concerning the 
Existence of An Agreement, as Well as the Terms of That 
Agreement, 
When establishing the existence of an agreement, the Act specifically 
allows for mediator testimony. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lc-107(2), a 
mediator may disclose "(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, 
whether a settlement was reached, and attendance; (b) a mediation communication 
as permitted under Section 78-31 c-106" (emphasis added). 
Under subsection (a), the confidentiality privilege does not extend to 
mediator testimony concerning the existence of settlement agreements. If the 
agreement between Craig Reese and LWP was a settlement agreement under the 
Act, it is not privileged and may be disclosed by the mediator pursuant to this 
Section. 
Other courts have agreed with this provision of the Act. For instance, in 
Riner v. Newbraugh, the court held that "a mediator can be called to testify to the 
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generalized issue of whether an agreement has been reached." 563 S.E.2d 802, 808 
(W.Va.2002). 
However, the Act goes even further than this in subsection (b), allowing the 
mediator to testify to other mediation communications if an exception under § 78-
31c-106 applies. As discussed supra in Part II.A, the exception test in § 106(2) 
does apply here. Therefore the Act would allow mediator testimony here as to not 
only the existence of an agreement, but the terms of the agreement as well. 
In Few v. Hammock Enters, Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), 
the parties had come to an agreement "on all issues," and all that remained was the 
execution by the parties' signatures. The defendants, however, refused to sign the 
settlement agreement. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce, and the defendants 
cited confidentiality privileges to bar introduction of the agreement. Id. at 293. 
The court ruled that a mediator may "testify or produce evidence on whether the 
parties reached a settlement agreement, and as to the terms of the agreement." Id. 
at 291. 
The facts of the instant case are very similar to those in Few. LWP and 
Craig Reese had come to an agreement on all issues, and the only thing that 
remained was for LWP to sign the agreement, which it refused to do. R59; R71-
72; R78. The mediator, Mr. Felt, argued to Ms. Acosta that the agreement was 
final and had been relied upon by Craig Reese in its agreement with Tingey. R59; 
R71-72; R78. Yet LWP is now attempting to use confidentiality to bar evidence of 
this agreement. This Court should adopt the reasoning of the Few court in 
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allowing testimony regarding the existence and essential terms of that agreement, 
particularly since the Uniform Mediation Act has specifically granted this 
exception. 
C. The Parties to the Lawsuit, Craig Reese and Tingey, Have 
Already Agreed to Disclose Some Communications Which Show 
the Existence and Essential Terms of a Settlement Agreement. 
The parties have decided the extent to which they will disclose mediation 
communications, and have carefully done so to avoid any communications 
regarding liability or private matters. Utah Code Annotated § 78-31c-108 states 
that "mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the 
parties or provided by other law or rule of this state" (emphasis added). Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-31c-103(3) provides: "If the parties agree in advance in a 
signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects agreement by the parties, that all 
or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges under Sections 78-3 lc-104 
through 78-3lc-106 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon" (emphasis 
added). 
The record of proceeding here reflects a clear agreement by the parties to 
disclose the existence and terms of a settlement agreement between Craig Reese 
and LWP. In the parties' Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, they 
disclosed facts regarding the agreement. R56-59. Also, Mr. Henriksen and Mr. 
Minnock, counsel for the parties, voluntarily disclosed information regarding the 
agreement in their supporting Affidavits. R72; R78. The information provided in 
the Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and its accompanying affidavits 
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regarding this settlement agreement was agreed upon by the parties and is 
therefore not privileged. 
The parties have been careful in the proceedings below not to disclose any 
mediation communications other than those establishing an agreement was reached 
and its essential terms. They have not disclosed confidential information regarding 
liability, dollar amounts, or specific mediation discussions. R54-79. In their Joint 
Motion to Enforce, the parties note that "the specific statements or comments 
made during the mediation need not be set forth here." R56. 
The district court allowed the parties to distinguish between specific, 
confidential information, and information simply disclosing an agreement and its 
terms. Judge Kouris, in the hearing on May 22, 2006, held that "the specifics of 
the case, that potentially could open liability to either side, has got to remain under 
absolute confidentiality. . . None of that stuff's been discussed. The only part 
that's been discussed was, do we have an agreement? Yes, we do. I agree. No, I 
don't agree. Those are the kind of things we're talking about." R213, May 22, 
2006 Hearing Transcript, 31. 
Judge Kouris also ruled, however, that the parties were permitted to 
disclose "conversations and agreements that were made" during the mediation. Id. 
at 45. He then directed the parties to "conduct a deposition [of Ms. Acosta] 
accordingly." Id. This Court should affirm this order and allow Craig Reese to 
take Ms. Acosta's limited deposition and introduce other evidence according to the 
limits set forth by the judge. 
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D. In Its Affidavits and Arguments Preceding This Appeal, LWP 
Has Already Effectively Waived Its Confidentiality Privileges 
Regarding the Agreement with Craig Reese. 
LWP has already effectively waived its right to confidentiality regarding 
disclosure of information pertaining to the settlement agreement. Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-31c-105(2) states that "[a] person that discloses or makes a 
representation about a mediation communication which prejudices another person 
in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104 . 
. . to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation 
or disclosure." 
Ms. Acosta, in her affidavits, makes "representations about mediation 
communications" which prejudice Craig Reese and thus waive the confidentiality 
privilege as to those representations. In Ms. Acosta's Affidavit attached to LWP's 
Opposition to Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement dated March 7, 2006, and 
in her subsequent Affidavit dated May 22, 2006, Ms. Acosta makes specific 
representations about the negotiations between LWP and Craig Reese in order to 
deny the existence of a binding agreement. Among other things, Ms. Acosta 
specifically denies the following: that she was "trying to reason with [my] client 
and explaining to them it was too late to change their mind"; that there was to be a 
waiver of the statutory offset for future medical and compensation payments; and 
that there was an agreement to reduce LWP's lien. She also states that: "no other 
concessions were ever made nor requested. It was never mentioned . . ."; "at no 
time . . . did Mr. Henriksen ask me if LWP was willing to waive its statutory 
on 
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right"; and "at no time did we discuss the issue of when LWP's obligation to pay 
medical payments would resume." R128-131; R132-133. 
LWP likewise makes a representation about mediation communications in 
three pages of its Reply to Respondent's Brief (Sections II.C and II.D), in an 
attempt to "rebut" Craig Reese's Statement of Facts in his original Brief. For 
instance, LWP specifically discusses the agreement provision that LWP waive its 
requirement that Craig Reese exhaust funds prior to LWP's continued medical 
payments. LWP claims that this term was never discussed between the parties. 
See Reply Brief of Real Party-in-Interest and Petitioner, LWP Solutions, Inc., 4, 7-
11. 
LWP cannot claim that its responses and affidavits should not be viewed by 
the Court as a waiver of the confidentiality proceedings. This might be the case if 
LWP were compelled and required to disclose these details, but the fact is that 
neither the district court nor this Court have required LWP to disclose anything. 
LWP prepared its affidavits and included these details without anyone asking it to 
do so. Judge Kouris, during the hearing held on May 22, 2006, even noted that it 
was "inconsistent" for LWP to claim confidentiality on one hand and then present 
a prepared affidavit with the other. R213; May 22, 2006 Hearing Transcript, 43. 
LWP disclosed its version of the facts completely voluntarily and free of coercion, 
despite its attempts to argue otherwise. 
These representations concerning the communications will certainly 
"prejudice" Craig Reese if he does not have the opportunity to respond with his 
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own evidence. It would be unjust to allow LWP's side of the story regarding the 
settlements reached at the mediation and to bar Craig Reese from telling his side. 
In Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, discussed supra, the court noted that "it would 
not serve the policy considerations of encouraging settlement by mediation or the 
policy favoring disclosure if a party was able to use mediation proceedings to 
engage in behavior that is prejudicial to the rights of other parties and then use the 
mediation privilege to insulate himself or herself from liability." 2006 WL 696320, 
a t * l l . 
LWP cannot argue this case on the merits and then retreat to its supposed 
fortress of confidentiality hoping to suppress any opposing arguments. It must 
choose one route or the other. Since it has already chosen to argue through 
discussion of mediation communications that there was no settlement agreement or 
discussions of the waiver of the statutory offset, Craig Reese must have the 
opportunity to respond. Therefore, the Court should rule that LWP has waived its 
confidentiality privilege, and remand so Craig Reese may introduce evidence to 
the extent necessary to establish the essential terms of the agreement, and refute 
LWP's claim that no agreement was reached. 
CONCLUSION 
While Respondent Craig Reese argues the Utah Uniform Mediation Act 
should not apply to this issue, even if this Court finds that it does apply, the facts 
of this case fit under many of the confidentiality exceptions outlined in the Act 
which allow for disclosure of evidence of an agreement. Craig Reese therefore 
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respectfully requests that this court affirm the lower court's holding allowing 
discovery and admission of evidence of an agreement between LWP and Craig 
Reese, including the limited deposition of Ms. Acosta and affidavits of those 
present, and remand to the lower court to determine whether an agreement was 
reached. 
DATED this J_ day of3(Jt& 2007. 
tichard Henriksen, Jr. 
Robert M. Henriksen 
Henriksen & Henriksen, P.C. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Murlyn Craig Reese 
is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 1 
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78-31b-l. Title. 
This act is known as the "Alternative Dispute Resolution Act." 
78-31b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and includes arbitration, mediation, and 
other means of dispute resolution, other than court trial, authorized by the Judicial Council under 
this chapter. 
(2) "ADR organization" means an organization which provides training for ADR 
providers or offers other ADR services. 
(3) "ADR provider" means a neutral person who conducts an ADR procedure. An 
arbitrator, mediator, and early neutral evaluator are ADR providers. An ADR provider may be 
an employee of the court or an independent contractor. 
(4) "Arbitration" means a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals who hear 
the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written award to resolve the 
issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6. 
(5) "Award" as used in connection with arbitration includes monetary or equitable relief 
and may include damages, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees. 
(6) "Civil action" means an action in which a party seeks monetary or equitable relief at 
common law or pursuant to statute. 
(7) "Early neutral evaluation" means a confidential meeting with a neutral expert to 
identify the issues in a dispute, explore settlement, and assess the merits of the claims. 
(8) "Mediation" means a private forum in which one or more impartial persons facilitate 
communication between parties to a civil action to promote a mutually acceptable resolution or 
settlement. 
(9) "Summary jury trial" means a summary presentation of a case to a jury which results 
in a nonbinding verdict. 
78-31b-3. Purpose and findings. 
(1) The purpose of this act is to offer an alternative or supplement to the formal 
processes associated with a court trial and to promote the efficient and effective operation of the 
courts of this state by authorizing and encouraging the use of alternative methods of dispute 
resolution to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions filed in the 
courts of this state. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution authorized by this act will secure 
the purposes of Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution, by providing supplemental or 
complementary means for the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes; 
(b) preservation of the confidentiality of ADR procedures will significantly aid the 
successful resolution of civil actions in a just, speedy, and inexpensive manner; 
(c) ADR procedures will reduce the need for judicial resources and the time and expense 
of the parties; 
(d) mediation has, in pilot programs, resulted in the just and equitable settlement of 
petitions for the protection of children under Section 78-3a-305 and petitions for the terminations 
of parental rights under Section 78-3a-405; and 
(e) the purpose of this act will be promoted by authorizing the Judicial Council to 
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establish rules to promote the use of ADR procedures by the courts of this state as an alternative 
or supplement to court trial. 
78-31b-4. Dispute Resolution Programs -- Director -- Duties -- Report 
(1) Within the Administrative Office of the Courts, there shall be a director of Dispute 
Resolution Programs, appointed by the state court administrator. 
(2) The director shall be an employee of the Administrative Office of the Courts and 
shall be responsible for the administration of all court-annexed Dispute Resolution Programs. 
The director shall have duties, powers, and responsibilities as the Judicial Council may 
determine. The qualifications for employment of the director shall be based on training and 
experience in the management, principles, and purposes of alternative dispute resolution 
procedures. 
(3) In order to implement the purposes of this act, the Administrative Office of the 
Courts may employ or contract with ADR providers or ADR organizations on a case-by-case 
basis, on a service basis, or on a program basis. ADR providers and organizations shall be 
subject to the rules and fees set by the Judicial Council. The Administrative Office of the Courts 
shall establish programs for training ADR providers and orienting attorneys and their clients to 
ADR programs and procedures. 
(4) An ADR provider is immune from all liability when conducting proceedings under 
the rules of the Judicial Council and the provisions of this act, except for wrongful disclosure of 
confidential information, to the same extent as a judge of the courts in this state. 
(5) The director shall report annually to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, the 
Judiciary Interim Committee, the governor, and the Utah State Bar on the operation of the 
Dispute Resolution Programs. 
(a) Copies of the report shall be available to the public at the Administrative Office of 
the Courts. 
(b) The report shall include: 
(i) identification of participating judicial districts and the methods of alternative dispute 
resolution that are available in those districts; 
(ii) the number and types of disputes received; 
(iii) the methods of alternative dispute resolution to which the disputes were referred; 
(iv) the course of the referral; 
(v) the status of cases referred to alternative dispute resolution or the disposition of these 
disputes; and 
(vi) any problems encountered in the administration of the program and the 
recommendations of the director as to the continuation or modification of any program. 
(c) Nothing may be included in a report which would impair the privacy or 
confidentiality of any specific ADR proceeding. 
78-31b-5. Judicial Council rules for ADR procedures. 
(1) To promote the use of ADR procedures, the Judicial Council may by rule establish 
experimental and permanent ADR programs administered by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts under the supervision of the director of Dispute Resolution Programs. 
(2) The rules of the Judicial Council shall be based upon the purposes and provisions of 
this act. Any procedural and evidentiary rules as the Supreme Court may adopt shall not impinge 
on the constitutional rights of any parties. 
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(3) The rules of the Judicial Council shall include provisions: 
(a) to orient parties and their counsel to the ADR program, ADR procedures, and the 
rules of the Judicial Council; 
(b) to identify types of civil actions that qualify for ADR procedures; 
(c) to refer to ADR procedures all or particular issues within a civil action; 
(d) to protect persons not parties to the civil action whose rights may be affected in the 
resolution of the dispute; 
(e) to ensure that no party or its attorney is prejudiced for electing, in good faith, not to 
participate in an optional ADR procedure; 
(f) to exempt any case from the ADR program in which the objectives of ADR would not 
be realized; 
(g) to create timetables to ensure that the ADR procedure is instituted and completed 
without undue delay or expense; 
(h) to establish the qualifications of ADR providers for each form of ADR procedure 
including that: 
(i) an ADR provider may, but need not be, a certified ADR provider pursuant to Title 58, 
Chapter 39a, Alternative Dispute Resolution Providers Certification Act; and 
(ii) formal education in any particular field may not, by itself, be either a prerequisite or 
sufficient qualification to serve as an ADR provider under the program authorized by this act; 
(i) to govern the conduct of each type of ADR procedure, including the site at which the 
procedure is conducted; 
(j) to establish the means for the selection of an ADR provider for each form of ADR 
procedure; 
(k) to determine the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the ADR provider for each 
form of ADR procedure; 
(1) to establish a code of ethics applicable to ADR providers with means for its 
enforcement; 
(m) to protect and preserve the privacy and confidentiality of ADR procedures; 
(n) to protect and preserve the privacy rights of the persons attending the ADR 
procedures; 
(0) to permit waiver of all or part of fees assessed for referral of a case to the ADR 
program on a showing of impecuniosity or other compelling reason; 
(p) to authorize imposition of sanctions for failure of counsel or parties to participate in 
good faith in the ADR procedure assigned; 
(q) to assess the fees to cover the cost of compensation for the services of the ADR 
provider and reimbursement for the provider's allowable, out-of-pocket expenses and 
disbursements; and 
(r) to allow vacation of an award by a court as provided in Section 78-31a-124. 
(4) The Judicial Council may, from time to time, limit the application of its ADR rules to 
particular judicial districts. 
78-31b-6. Minimum procedures for arbitration. 
(1) An award in an arbitration proceeding shall be in writing and, at the discretion of the 
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, may state the reasons or otherwise explain the nature or amount 
of the award. 
(2) The award shall be final and enforceable as any other judgment in a civil action, 
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unless: 
(a) within 30 days after the filing of the award with the clerk of the court; any party files 
with the clerk of court a demand for a trial de novo upon which the case shall be returned to the 
trial calendar; or 
(b) any party files with the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators and serves a copy on all other 
parties a written request to modify the award on the grounds: 
(i) there is an evident miscalculation of figures or description of persons or property 
referred to in the award; 
(ii) the award does not dispose of all the issues presented to the arbitrator or panel of 
arbitrators for resolution; or 
(iii) the award purports to resolve issues not submitted for resolution in the arbitration 
process. 
(c) The period for filing a demand for trial de novo is tolled until the arbitrator or panel 
of arbitrators have acted on the request to modify the award, which must be completed within 30 
days of the filing. 
(3) The parties to an arbitration procedure may stipulate that: 
(a) an award need not be filed with the court, except in those cases where the rights of 
third parties may be affected by the provisions of the award; and 
(b) the case is dismissed in which the award was made. 
(4) (a) At any time the parties may enter into a written agreement for referral of the case 
or of issues in the case to arbitration pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration 
Act, or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq., as the parties shall specify. 
(b) The court may dismiss the case, or if less than all the issues are referred to arbitration, 
stay the case for a reasonable period for the parties to complete a private arbitration proceeding. 
78-31b-7. Minimum procedures for mediation. 
(1) A judge or court commissioner may refer to mediation any case for which the Judicial 
Council and Supreme Court have established a program or procedures. A party may file with the 
court an objection to the referral which may be granted for good cause. 
(2) (a) Unless all parties and the neutral or neutrals agree only parties, their 
representatives, and the neutral may attend the mediation sessions. 
(b) If the mediation session is pursuant to a referral under Subsection 78-3a-109(9), the 
ADR provider or ADR organization shall notify all parties to the proceeding and any person 
designated by a party. The ADR provider may notify any person whose rights may be affected by 
the mediated agreement or who may be able to contribute to the agreement. A party may request 
notice be provided to a person who is not a party. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), any settlement agreement between the 
parties as a result of mediation may be executed in writing, filed with the clerk of the court, and 
enforceable as a judgment of the court. If the parties stipulate to dismiss the action, any 
agreement to dismiss shall not be filed with the court. 
(b) With regard to mediation affecting any petition filed under Section 78-3a-305 or 
78-3a-405: 
(i) all settlement agreements and stipulations of the parties shall be filed with the court; 
(ii) all timelines, requirements, and procedures described in Title 78, Chapter 3a, Parts 3 
and 4, and in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, shall be complied with; and 
(iii) the parties to the mediation may not agree to a result that could not have been 
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ordered by the court in accordance with the procedures and requirements of Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Parts 3 and 4, and Title 62A, Chapter 4a. 
78-31b-8. Confidentiality, 
(1) ADR proceedings shall be conducted in a manner that encourages informal and 
confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the dispute or a part of 
the dispute. ADR proceedings shall be closed unless the parties agree that the proceedings be 
open. ADR proceedings shall not be recorded. 
(2) No evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an ADR proceeding may be 
subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent trial of the same case or same issues 
between the same parties. 
(3) No party to the case may introduce as evidence information obtained during an ADR 
proceeding unless the information was discovered from a source independent of the ADR 
proceeding. 
(4) Unless all parties and the neutral agree, no person attending an ADR proceeding, 
including the ADR provider or ADR organization, may disclose or be required to disclose any 
information obtained in the course of an ADR proceeding, including any memoranda, notes, 
records, or work product. 
(5) Except as provided, an ADR provider or ADR organization may not disclose or 
discuss any information about any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the proceeding, including 
the judge or judges to whom the case may be assigned. An ADR provider or an ADR 
organization may communicate information about an ADR proceeding with the director for the 
purposes of training, program management, or program evaluation and when consulting with a 
peer. In making those communications, the ADR provider or ADR organization shall render 
anonymous all identifying information. 
(6) Nothing in this section limits or affects the responsibility to report child abuse or 
neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4a-403. 
(7) No records of ADR proceedings under this act or under Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah 
Uniform Arbitration Act, shall be subject to Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act, except settlement agreements filed with the court after conclusion of an 
ADR proceeding or awards filed with the court after the period for filing a demand for trial de 
novo has expired. 
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78-31c-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Mediation Act." 
78-31c-102. Definitions, 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mediation" means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and 
negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their 
dispute. 
(2) "Mediation communication" means conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a record, 
verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering, 
conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a 
mediator. 
(3) "Mediation party" means a person that participates in a mediation and whose 
agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute. 
(4) "Mediator" means an individual who is neutral and conducts a mediation. 
(5) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party or mediator, that 
participates in a mediation. 
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, partnership, 
limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, 
agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(7) "Proceeding" means: 
(a) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related 
prehearing and posthearing motions, conferences, and discovery; or 
(b) a legislative hearing or similar process. 
(8) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored 
in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
(9) "Sign" means: 
(a) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol with the present intent to authenticate a record; 
or 
(b) to attach or logically associate an electronic symbol, sound, or process to or with a 
record with the present intent to authenticate a record. 
78-31c-103. Scope. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2) or (3), this chapter applies to a 
mediation in which: 
(a) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute, court, or administrative 
agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator; 
(b) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that demonstrates 
an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against disclosure; or 
(c) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds himself or herself out 
as a mediator or the mediation is provided by an entity that holds itself out as providing 
mediation. 
(2) The chapter does not apply to a mediation: 
(a) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or termination of a 
collective bargaining relationship; 
(b) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes established by a 
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collective bargaining agreement, except that the chapter applies to a mediation arising out of a 
dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court; 
(c) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or 
(d) conducted under the auspices of: 
(i) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students; or 
(ii) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are residents of that institution. 
(3) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects 
agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges under 
Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon. 
However, Sections 78-31c-104 through 78-31c-106 apply to a mediation communication made 
by a person that has not received actual notice of the agreement before the communication is 
made. 
78-31c-104. Privilege against disclosure -- Admissibility -- Discovery. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-31c-106, a mediation communication is 
privileged as provided in Subsection (2) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence 
in a proceeding unless waived or precluded as provided by Section 78-31c-105. 
(2) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply: 
(a) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from 
disclosing, a mediation communication. 
(b) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent any 
other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator. 
(c) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from 
disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant. 
(3) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not 
become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or use in a 
mediation. 
78-31c-105. Waiver and preclusion of privilege. 
(1) A privilege under Section 78-31c-104 may be waived in a record or orally during a 
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation, and: 
(a) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator; and 
(b) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the 
nonparty participant. 
(2) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation communication 
which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under 
Section 78-31c-104, but only to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the 
representation or disclosure. 
(3) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit a 
crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from asserting a 
privilege under Section 78-3 lc-104. 
78-31c-106. Exceptions to privilege. 
(1) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 for a mediation communication that 
is: 
(a) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement; 
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(b) available to the public under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, or made during a mediation session which is open, or is required by law to be 
open, to the public; 
(c) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence; 
(d) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to 
conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity; 
(e) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional 
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator; 
(f) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), sought or offered to prove or disprove 
a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediation party, 
nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation; 
or 
(g) subject to the reporting requirements in Section 62A-3-305 or 62A-4a-403, 
(2) There is no privilege under Section 78-31c-104 if a court, administrative agency, or 
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the 
evidence has shown that: 
(a) the evidence is not otherwise available; 
(b) there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting 
confidentiality; and 
(c) the mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
(i) a court proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor; or 
(ii) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a proceeding to prove a claim to 
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation. 
(3) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication 
referred to in Subsection (l)(f) or (2)(c)(ii). 
(4) If a mediation communication is not privileged under Subsection (1) or (2), only the 
portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure 
may be admitted. Admission of evidence under Subsection (1) or (2) does not render the 
evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other 
purpose. 
78-31c-107. Prohibited mediator reports. 
(1) Except as required in Subsection (2), a mediator may not make a report, assessment, 
evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to a court, 
administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject 
of the mediation. 
(2) A mediator may disclose: 
(a) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, 
and attendance; 
(b) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 78-3 lc-106; or 
(c) a mediation communication evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation 
of an individual to a public agency responsible for protecting individuals against such 
mistreatment. 
(3) A communication made in violation of Subsection (1) may not be considered by a 
court, administrative agency, or arbitrator. 
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78-31c-108. Confidentiality. 
Unless subject to Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act, and Title 63, 
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, mediation communications are 
confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this state. 
78-31c-109. Mediator's disclosure of conflicts of interest« Background. 
(1) Before accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested to serve as a mediator 
shall: 
(a) make an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether 
there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the 
impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the 
mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable participant in 
the mediation; and 
(b) disclose any known fact to the mediation parties as soon as practical before accepting 
a mediation. 
(2) If a mediator learns any fact described in Subsection (l)(a) after accepting a 
mediation, the mediator shall disclose it as soon as practicable. 
(3) At the request of a mediation party, an individual who is requested to serve as a 
mediator shall disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute. 
(4) Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) do not apply to an individual acting as a judge or 
ombudsman. 
(5) This chapter does not require that a mediator have a special qualification by 
background or profession. 
(6) A mediator must be impartial, unless after disclosure of the facts required in 
Subsections (1) and (2) to be disclosed, the parties agree otherwise. 
78-31c-110. Participation in mediation. 
An attorney or other individual designated by a party may accompany the party to, and 
participate in, a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the mediation may be 
rescinded. 
78-31c-lll. International commercial mediation. 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "International commercial mediation" means an international commercial conciliation 
as defined in Article 1 of the Model Law. 
(b) "Model Law" means the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 June 2002 and 
recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution (A/RES/57/18) dated 19 
November 2002. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), if a mediation is an 
international commercial mediation, the mediation is governed by the Model Law. 
(3) Unless the parties agree in accordance with Subsection 78-31c-103(3) that all or part 
of an international commercial mediation is not privileged, Sections 78-31c-104 through 
78-31c-106 and any applicable definitions in Section 78-31c-102 of this chapter apply to the 
mediation and nothing in Article 10 of the Model Law derogates from Sections 78-31c-104 
through 78-31c-106. 
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(4) If the parties to an international commercial mediation agree under Article 1, Section 
(7), of the Model Law that the Model Law does not apply, this chapter applies. 
78-31c-112. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce 
Act. 
This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or 
supersede Section 101(c) of that act or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices 
described in Section 103(b) of that act. 
78-31c-113. Uniformity of application and construction. 
In applying and construing this chapter, consideration should be given to the need to 
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 
78-31c-114. Application to existing agreements or referrals. 
(1) This chapter governs a mediation pursuant to a referral or an agreement to mediate 
made on or after May 1, 2006. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), on or after May 1, 2007, this chapter governs all 
agreements to mediate whenever made. 
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SECTION 3. SCOPE. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (c), this [Act] applies to a 
mediation in which: 
(1) the mediation parties are required to mediate by statute or court or 
administrative agency rule or referred to mediation by a court, administrative agency, or 
arbitrator; 
(2) the mediation parties and the mediator agree to mediate in a record that 
demonstrates an expectation that mediation communications will be privileged against 
disclosure; or 
(3) the mediation parties use as a mediator an individual who holds 
himself or herself out as a mediator or the mediation is provided by a person that holds itself out 
as providing mediation. 
(b) The [Act] does not apply to a mediation: 
(1) relating to the establishment, negotiation, administration, or 
termination of a collective bargaining relationship; 
(2) relating to a dispute that is pending under or is part of the processes 
established by a collective bargaining agreement, except that the [Act] applies to a mediation 
arising out of a dispute that has been filed with an administrative agency or court; 
(3) conducted by a judge who might make a ruling on the case; or 
(4) conducted under the auspices of: 
(A) a primary or secondary school if all the parties are students or 
(B) a correctional institution for youths if all the parties are 
residents of that institution. 
(c) If the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding 
reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged, the privileges 
under Sections 4 through 6 do not apply to the mediation or part agreed upon. However, 
Sections 4 through 6 apply to a mediation communication made by a person that has not received 
actual notice of the agreement before the communication is made. 
Legislative Note: To the extent that the Act applies to mediations conducted under the authority 
of a State's courts, State judiciaries should consider enacting conforming court rules. 
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Comment 
1. In general. 
The Act is broad in its coverage of mediation, a departure from the common state statutes 
that apply to mediation in particular contexts, such as court-connected mediation or community 
mediation, or to the mediation of particular types of disputes, such as worker's compensation or 
civil rights. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 48-168 (1993) (worker's compensation); Iowa 
Code Section 216.15A (1999) (civil rights). Moreover, unlike many mediation privileges, it also 
applies in some contexts in which the Rules of Evidence are not consistently followed, such as 
administrative hearings and arbitration. 
Whether the Act in fact applies is a crucial issue because it determines not only the 
application of the mediation privilege but also whether the mediator has the obligations 
regarding the disclosure of conflicts of interest and, if asked, qualifications in Section 9; is 
prohibited from making disclosures about the mediation to courts, agencies and investigative 
authorities in Section 7; and must accommodate requirements regarding accompanying 
individuals in Section 10. 
Because of the breadth of the Act's coverage, it is important to delineate its scope with 
precision. Section 3(a) sets forth three different mechanisms that trigger the Act's coverage, and 
will likely cover most mediation situations that commonly arise. Section 3(b) on the other hand, 
carves out a series of narrow and specific exemptions from the Act's coverage. Finally, Section 
3(c) provides a vehicle through which parties who would be mediating in a context covered by 
Section 3(a) may "opt out" of the Act's protections and responsibilities. The central operating 
principle throughout this Section is that the Act should support, and guide, the parties' reasonable 
expectations about whether the mediations in which they are participating are included within 
the scope of the Act. 
2. Section 3(a). Mediations covered by Act; triggering mechanisms. 
Section 3(a) sets forth three conditions, the satisfaction of any one of which will trigger 
the application of the Act. This triggering requirement is necessary because the many different 
forms, contexts, and practices of mediation and other methods of dispute resolution make it 
sometimes difficult to know with certainty whether one is engaged in a mediation or some other 
dispute resolution or prevention process that employs mediation and related principles. See, e.g., 
Ellen J. Waxman & Howard Gadlin, Ombudsmen: A Buffer Between Institutions, Individuals, 4 
Disp. Resol. Mag. 21 (Summer 1998) (describing functions of ombuds, which can at times 
include mediation concepts and skills); Janice Fleischer & Zena Zumeta, Group Facilitation: A 
Way to Address Problems Collaboratively, 4 Disp. Resol. Mag.. 4 (Summer 1998) (comparing 
post-dispute mediation with pre-dispute facilitation); Lindsay "Peter" White, Partnering: 
Agreeing to Work Together on Problems, 4 Disp. Resol. Mag. 18 (Summer 1998) (describing a 
common collaborative problem solving technique used in the construction industry). This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that unlike other professionals - such as doctors, lawyers, and 
social workers - mediators are not licensed and the process they conduct is informal. If the intent 
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to mediate is not clear, even a casual discussion over a backyard fence might later be deemed to 
have been a mediation, unfairly surprising those involved and frustrating the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. The first triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(1), subject to exceptions 
provided in 3(b), covers those situations in which mediation parties are either required to 
mediate or referred to mediation by governmental institutions or by an arbitrator. Administrative 
agencies include those public agencies with the authority to prescribe rules and regulations to 
administer a statute, as well as the authority to adjudicate matters arising under such a statute. 
They include agricultural departments, child protective services, civil rights commissions and 
worker's compensation boards, to name only a few. Through this triggering mechanism, the 
formal court-referred mediation that many people associate with mediation is clearly covered by 
the Act. 
Where Section 3(a)(1) focuses on publicly referred mediations, the second triggering 
mechanism, Section 3(a)(2), furthers party autonomy by allowing mediation parties and the 
mediator to trigger the Act by agreeing to mediate in a record that is signed by the parties and by 
the mediator. A later note by one party that they agreed to mediate would not constitute a record 
of an agreement to mediate. In addition, the record must demonstrate the expectation of the 
mediation parties and the mediator that the mediation communications will have a privilege 
against disclosure. 
Yet significantly, these individuals are not required to use any magic words to obtain the 
protection of the Act. See Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 
(Minn. 1998). The lack of a requirement for magic words tracks the intent to be inclusive and to 
embrace the many different approaches to mediation. Moreover, were magic words required, 
party and mediator expectations of confidentiality under the Act might be frustrated, since a 
mediation would only be covered by the Act if the institution remembered to include them in any 
agreement. 
The phrase "privileged against disclosure" clarifies the type of expectations that the 
record must demonstrate tin order to show an expectation of confidentiality in a subsequent legal 
setting. Mere generalized expectations of confidentiality in a non-legal setting are not enough to 
trigger the Act if the case does not fit under Sections 3(a)(1) or 3(a)(3). Take for example a 
dispute in a university between the heads of the Spanish and Latin departments that is mediated 
or "worked out informally" with the assistance of the head of the French department, at the 
suggestion of the university provost. Such a mediation would not reasonably carry with it party 
or mediator expectations that the mediation would be conducted pursuant to an evidentiary 
privilege, rights of disclosure and accompaniment and the other protections and obligations of 
the Act. Indeed, some of the parties and the mediator may more reasonably expect that the 
mediation results, and even the underlying discussions, would be disclosed to the university 
provost, and perhaps communicated throughout the parties' respective departments and 
elsewhere on campus. By contrast, however, if the university has a written policy regarding the 
mediation of disputes that embraces the Act, and the mediation is specifically conducted 
pursuant to that policy, and the parties agree to participate in mediation in a record signed by the 
parties, then the parties would reasonably expect that the Act would apply and conduct 
themselves accordingly, both in the mediation and beyond. 
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The third triggering mechanism, Section 3(a)(3), focuses on individuals and 
organizations that provide mediation services and provides that the Act applies when the 
mediation is conducted by one who is held out as a mediator. For example, disputing neighbors 
who mediate with a volunteer at a community mediation center would be covered by the Act, 
since the center holds itself out as providing mediation services. Similarly, mediations conducted 
by a private mediator who advertises his or her services as a mediator would also be covered, 
since the private mediator holds himself or herself out to the public as a mediator. Because the 
mediator is publicly held out as a mediator, the parties may reasonably expect mediations they 
conduct to be conducted pursuant to relevant law, specifically the Act. By including those 
mediations conducted by private mediators who hold themselves out as mediators, the Act tracks 
similar doctrines regarding other professions. In other contexts, "holding out" has included 
making a representation in a public manner of being in the business or having another person 
make that representation. See 18A Am. Jur.2d Corporations Section 271 (1985). 
Mediations can be conducted by ombuds practitioners. See Standards for the 
Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices (August 2001). If such a mediation is 
conducted pursuant to one of these triggering mechanisms, such as a written agreement under 
Section 3(a)(2), it will be protected under the terms of the Act. There is no intent by the Drafters 
to exclude or include mediations conducted by an ombuds a priori. The terms of the Act 
determine applicability, not a mediator's formal title. 
Finally, on the issue of Section 3(a) inclusions into the Act, the Drafting Committees 
discussed whether it should cover the many cultural and religious practices that are similar to 
mediation and that use a person similar to the mediator, as defined in this Act. On the one hand, 
many of these cultural and religious practices, like more traditional mediation, streamline and 
resolve conflicts, while solving problems and restoring relationships. Some examples of these 
practices are Ho'oponopono, circle ceremonies, family conferencing, and pastoral or marital 
counseling. These cultural and religious practices bring richness to the quality of life and 
contribute to traditional mediation. On the other hand, there are instances in which the 
application of the Act to these practices would be disruptive of the practices and therefore 
undesirable. On balance, furthering the principle of self-determination, the Drafting Committees 
decided that those involved should make the choice to be covered by the Act in those instances 
in which other definitional requirements of Section 2 are met by entering into an agreement to 
mediate reflected by a record or securing a court or agency referral pursuant to Section 3(a)(1). 
At the same time, these persons could opt out the Act's coverage by not using this triggering 
mechanism. This leaves a great deal of leeway, appropriately, with those involved in the 
practices. 
3. Section 3(b)(1) and (2). Exclusion of collective bargaining disputes. 
Collective bargaining disputes are excluded because of the longstanding, solidified, and 
substantially uniform mediation systems that already are in place in the collective bargaining 
context. See Memorandum from ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law of the American 
Bar Association to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters 2 (Jan. 23, 2000) (on file with UMA 
Drafting Committees); Letter from New York State Bar Association Labor and Employment 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Law Section to Reporters, Uniform Mediation Act 2-4 (Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with UMA 
Drafting Committees). This exclusion includes the mediation of disputes arising under the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as mediations relating to the formation of a 
collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, the exclusion does not include employment 
discrimination disputes not arising under the collective bargaining agreement as well as 
employment disputes arising after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Mediations of disputes in these contexts remain within the protections and responsibilities of the 
Act. 
4. Section 3(b)(3). Exclusion of certain judicial conferences. 
Difficult issues arise in mediations that are conducted by judges during the course of 
settlement conferences related to pending litigation, and this Section excludes certain judicially 
conducted mediations from the Act. Some have the concern that party autonomy in mediation 
may be constrained either by the direct coercion of a judicial officer who may make a subsequent 
ruling on the matter, or by the indirect coercive effect that inherently inures from the parties' 
knowledge of the ultimate presence of that judge. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too 
Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to Them For Trial, 6 Disp. Resol. Mag. 11 
(Fall 1999), and Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, 6 Disp. Resol. Mag. 11 (Fall 1999). 
This concern is further complicated by the variegated nature of judicial settlement 
conferences. As a general matter, judicial settlement conferences are typically conducted under 
court or procedural rules that are similar to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
have come to include a wide variety of functions, from simple case management to a venue for 
court-ordered mediations. See Mont. R. Civ. P., Rule 16(a). In situations in which a part of the 
function of judicial conferences is case management, the parties hardly have an expectation of 
confidentiality in the proceedings, even though there may be settlement discussions initiated or 
facilitated by the judge or judicial officer. In fact, such hearings frequently lead to court orders 
on discovery and issues limitations that are entered into the public record. In such circumstances, 
the policy rationales supporting the confidentiality privilege and other provisions of the Act are 
not furthered. 
On the other hand, there are judicially-hosted settlement conferences that for all practical 
purposes are mediation sessions for which the Act's policies of promoting full and frank 
discussions between the parties would be furthered. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting 
Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1 
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory 
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485 (1985). 
The Act recognizes the tension created by this wide variety of settlement functions by 
drawing a line with regard to those conferences that are covered by the Act and those that are not 
covered by the Act. The Act excludes those settlement conferences in which information from 
the mediation is communicated to a judge with responsibility for the case. This is consistent with 
the prohibition on mediator reports to courts in Section 7. The term "judge" in Section 3(b)(3) 
includes magistrates, special masters, referees, and any other persons responsible for making 
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rulings or recommendations on the case. However, the Act does not apply to a court mediator, or 
a mediator who contracts or volunteers to mediate cases for a court because they may not make 
later rulings on the case. Similarly mediations conducted by judges specifically and exclusively 
are assigned to mediate cases, so-called "buddy judges," and retired judges who return to 
mediate cases do not fall within the Section 3(b)(3) exemption because such mediators do not 
make later rulings on the case. 
Local rules are usually not recognized beyond the court's jurisdiction, and may not 
provide assurance of confidentiality if the mediation communications are sought in andther 
jurisdiction, and if the jurisdiction does not permit recognize privilege by local rule. 
5. Section 3(b)(4)(A). Exclusion of peer mediation. 
The Act also exempts mediations between students conducted under the auspices of 
school programs because the supervisory needs of schools toward students, particularly in peer 
mediation, may not be consistent with the confidentiality provisions of the Act. For example, 
school administrators need to be able to respond to, and in a proceeding verify, legitimate threats 
to student safety or domestic violence that may surface during a mediation between students. See 
Memorandum from ABA Section of Dispute Resolution to Uniform Mediation Act Reporters 
(Nov. 15, 1999) (on file with UMA Drafting Committees). The law has "repeatedly emphasized 
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, 
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1969), citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390,402(1923). 
This exemption does not include mediations involving a teacher, parent, or other non-
student as such an exemption might preclude coverage of truancy mediation and other mediation 
sessions for which the privilege is pertinent. 
6. Section 3(b)(4)(B). Exclusion of correctional institutions for youth. 
The Act also exempts programs involving youths at correctional institutions if the 
mediation parties are all residents of the institution. This is to facilitate and encourage mediation 
and conflict prevention and resolution techniques among those juveniles who have well-
documented and profound needs in those areas. Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The 
Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 Ind. L.J. 999, 1021 (1991). Exempting 
these programs serves the same policies as are served by the peer mediation exclusion for non-
incarcerated youths. The Drafters do not intend to exclude cases where at least one party is not a 
resident, such as a class action suit against a non-resident in which the parties mediate or attempt 
to mediate the case. 
7. Section 3(c). Alternative of non-privileged mediation. 
This Section allows the parties to opt for a non-privileged mediation or mediation session 
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by mutual agreement, and furthers the Act's policy of party self-determination. If the parties so 
agree, the privilege sections of the Act do not apply, thus fulfilling the parties reasonable 
expectations regarding the confidentiality of that mediation or session. For example, parties in a 
sophisticated commercial mediation, who are represented by counsel, may see no need for a 
privilege to attach to a mediation or session, and may by express written agreement "opt out" of 
the Act's privilege provisions. Similarly, parties may also use this option if they wish to rely on, 
and therefore use in evidence, statements made during the mediation. It is the parties rather than 
the mediator who make this choice, although a mediator could presumably refuse to mediate a 
mediation or session that is not covered by this Act. Even if the parties do not agree in advance, 
the parties, mediator, and all nonparty participants can waive the privilege pursuant to Section 5. 
In this instance, however, the mediator and other participants can block the waiver in some 
respects. 
If the parties want to opt out, they should inform the mediators or nonparty participants 
of this agreement, because without actual notice, the privileges of the Act still apply to the 
mediation communications of the persons who have not been so informed until such notice is 
actually received. Thus, for example, if a nonparty participant has not received notice that the 
opt-out has been invoked, and speaks during a mediation, that mediation communication is 
privileged under the Act. If, however, one of the parties or the mediator tells the nonparty 
participant that the opt-out has been invoked, the privilege no longer attaches to statements made 
after the actual notice has been provided, even though the earlier statements remain privileged 
because of the lack of notice. 
8. Other scope issues. 
The Act would apply to all mediations that fit the definitions of mediation by a mediator 
unless specifically excluded by the State adopting the Act. For example, a State may want to 
exclude international commercial conciliation, which is covered by specific statute in some 
States. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 1-567.60 (1991); Cal. Civ. Pro. Section 1297.401 (West 
1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 684.10 (1986). 
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really a mediation that would privilege those communications in a later criminal or civil case. 
This Section should be read together with Section 6(a)(4), which applies to particular 
communications within a mediation which are used for the same purposes. The two differ on the 
purpose of the mediation: Section 5(c) applies when the mediation itself is used to further a 
crime, while Section 6(a)(4) applies to matters that are being mediated for other purposes but 
which include discussion of acts or statements that may be deemed criminal in nature. Under 
Section 5(c), the preclusion applies to all mediation communications because the purpose of the 
mediation frustrates public policy. Under Section 6(a)(4), the preclusion only applies to those 
mediation communications that have a criminal character; the privilege may still be asserted to 
block the introduction of other communications made during the mediation. This rationale is 
discussed more fully in the comments to Section 6(a)(4). 
SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE. 
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is: 
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the 
agreement; 
(2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open records 
act] or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is required by law to be open, to 
the public; 
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a 
crime of violence; 
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a 
crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity; 
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of 
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator; 
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered to 
prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a 
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mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring 
during a mediation; or 
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or 
exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a party, unless 
the 
[Alternative A: [State to insert, for example, child or adult 
protection] case is referred by a court to mediation and a public agency participates.] 
[Alternative B: public agency participates in the [State to insert, 
for example, child or adult protection] mediation]. 
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or 
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of 
the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the 
evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the 
mediation communication is sought or offered in: 
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or 
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a 
claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the 
mediation. 
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication 
referred to in subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2). 
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under subsection (a) or (b), only the 
portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure 
may be admitted. Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the 
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evidence, or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other 
purpose. 
Legislative Note: If the enacting state does not have an open records act, the following 
language in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) needs to be deleted: "available to the public under 
[insert statutory reference to open records act] or". 
Comment 
1. In general. 
This Section articulates specific and exclusive exceptions to the broad grant of privilege 
provided to mediation communications in Section 4. As with other privileges, when it is 
necessary to consider evidence in order to determine if an exception applies, the Act 
contemplates that a court will hold an in camera proceeding at which the claim for exemption 
from the privilege can be confidentially asserted and defended. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior 
Court, 74 CaL Rptr.2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998); Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F.Supp.2d 
1110, 1131-33 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing whether an in camera hearing is necessary). 
The exceptions in Section 6(a) apply regardless of the need for the evidence because 
society's interest in the information contained in the mediation communications may be said to 
categorically outweigh its interest in the confidentiality of mediation communications. In 
contrast, the exceptions under Section 6(b) would apply only in situations where the relative 
strengths of society's interest in a mediation communication and mediation participant interest in 
confidentiality can only be measured under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
The Act places the burden on the proponent of the evidence to persuade the court in a non-public 
hearing that the evidence is not otherwise available, that the need for the evidence substantially 
outweighs the confidentiality interests and that the evidence comes within one of the exceptions 
listed under Section 6(b). In other words, the exceptions listed in 6(b) include situations that 
should remain confidential but for overriding concerns for justice. 
2. Section 6(a)(1). Record of an agreement. 
This exception would permit evidence of a signed agreement, such as an agreement to 
mediate, an agreement regarding how the mediation should be conducted ~ including whether 
the parties and mediator may disclose outside of proceedings, or, more commonly, written 
agreements memorializing the parties' resolution of the dispute. The exception permits such an 
agreement to be introduced in a subsequent court proceeding convened to determine whether the 
terms of that settlement agreement had been breached. 
The words "agreement evidenced by a record" and "signed" refer to written and executed 
agreements, those recorded by tape recorded and ascribed to by the parties on the tape, and other 
electronic means to record and sign, as defined in Sections 2(9) and 2(10). In other words, a 
participant's notes about an oral agreement would not be a signed agreement. On the other hand, 
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the following situations would be considered a signed agreement: a handwritten agreement that 
the parties have signed, an e-mail exchange between the parties in which they agree to particular 
provisions, and a tape recording in which they state what constitutes their agreement. 
Written agreements are commonly excepted from mediation confidentiality protections, 
permitting the Act to embrace current practices in a majority of States. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Section 12-2238 (1993); Cal. Evid. Code Section 1120(1) (West 1997) (general); Cal. Evid. 
Code Section 1123 (West 1997) (general); Cal. Gov't. Code Section 12980(i) (West 1998) 
(housing discrimination); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 24-34-506.5 (1993) (housing discrimination); 
Ga. Code Ann. Section 45-19-36(e) (1989) (fair employment); 775 111. Comp. Stat. Section 5/7B-
102(E)(3) (1989) (human rights); Ind. Code Section 679.2 (1998) (general); Iowa. Code Ann. 
Section 216.15(B) (1999) (civil rights); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 344.200(4) (1996) (civil 
rights); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (1997) (general); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Section 51:2257(D) (1998) (human rights); 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 4612(1)(A) (1995) 
(human rights); Md. Code 1957 Ann. Art. 49(B) Section 28 (1991) (human rights); Mass. Gen. 
Laws. ch. 151B, Section 5 (1991) (job discrimination); Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 213.077 (1992) 
(human rights); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 43-2908 (1993) (parenting act); N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 
10:5-14 (1992) (civil rights); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 36.220(2)(a) (1997) (general); Or. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. 36.262 (1989) (agricultural foreclosure); 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Section 5949(b)(1) 
(1996) (general); Tenn. Code Ann. Section 4-21-303(d) (1996) (human rights); Tex. Gov't. Code 
Ann. Section 2008.057 (1999) (Administrative Procedure Act); Vt. R. Civ. P., Rule 16.3 (1998) 
(general civil); Va. Code Ann. Section 8.01-576.10 (1994) (general); Va. Code Ann. Section 
8.01-581.22 ( 1988) (general); Wash. Rev. Code Section 5.60.070 (l)(e) and (f) (1993) ( 1993) 
(general); Wash. Rev. Code Section 26.09.015(3) (1991) (divorce); Wash. Rev. Code Section 
49.60.240 (1995) (human rights); W.Va. Code Section 5-11 A-11(b)(4) (1992) (fair housing); 
W.Va. Code Section 6B-2-4(r) (1990) (public employees); Wis. Stat. Section 767.11(12) (1993) 
(family court); Wis. Stat. Section 904.085(4)(a) (1997) (general). 
This exception is noteworthy only for what is not included: oral agreements. The 
disadvantage of exempting oral settlements is that nearly everything said during a mediation 
session could bear on either whether the parties came to an agreement or the content of the 
agreement. In other words, an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow the rule 
of privilege. As a result, mediation participants might be less candid, not knowing v/hether a 
controversy later would erupt over an oral agreement. Unfortunately, excluding evidence of oral 
settlements reached during a mediation session would operate to the disadvantage of a less 
legally sophisticated party who is accustomed to the enforcement of oral settlements reached in 
negotiations. Such a person might also mistakenly assume the admissibility of evidence of oral 
settlements reached in mediation as well. However, because the majority of courts and statutes 
limit the confidentiality exception to signed written agreements, one would expect that mediators 
and others will soon incorporate knowledge of a writing requirement into their practices. See 
Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805 (Ind., 2000) (citing draft Uniform Mediation Act); Ryan v. 
Garcia, 27 Cal. App.4th 1006, 1012 (1994) (privilege statute precluded evidence of oral 
agreement); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So.2d 7,9 (Fla. App. 1992) (privilege statute precluded 
evidence of oral settlement); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2317.023 (West 1996). For an 
example of a state statute permitting the enforcement of oral agreements under certain narrow 
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circumstances, see Cal. Evid. Code Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997) (providing that oral 
agreement must be memorialized in writing within 72 hours). 
Despite the limitation on oral agreements, the Act leaves parties other means to preserve 
the agreement quickly. For example, parties can agree that the mediation has ended, state their 
oral agreement into the tape recorder and record their assent. See Regents of the University of 
California v. Sumner, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1212 (1996). This approach was codified in Cal. 
Evid. Code Section 1118, 1124 (West 1997). 
The parties may still provide that particular settlements agreements are confidential with 
regard to disclosure to the general public, and provide for sanctions for the party who discloses 
voluntarily. See Stephen A. Hochman, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trap for the Unwary, 
SB41 ALI-ABA 605 (1995). However, confidentiality agreements reached in mediation, like 
those in other settlement situations, are subject to the need for evidence and public policy 
considerations. See Cole et al., supra, Section 9.23, 9.25. 
3. Section 6(a)(2). Mediations open to the public; meetings and records made open 
by law. 
Section 6(a)(2) makes clear that the privileges in Section 4 do not preempt state open 
meetings and open records laws, thus deferring to the policies of the individual States regarding 
the types of meetings that will be subject to these laws. In addition, it provides an exception 
when the mediation is opened to the public, such as a televised mediation. 
This exception recognizes that there should be no after-the-fact confidentiality for 
communications that were made in a meeting that was either voluntarily open to the public -
such as a workgroup meeting in a federal negotiated rule making that was made open to the 
general public, even though not required by Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to be 
open - or was required to be open to the public pursuant to an open meeting law. For example, 
the Act would provide no privilege if an agency holds a closed meeting but FACA would require 
that it be open. This exception also applies if a meeting was properly closed but an open record 
law requires that the meeting summaries or other documents - perhaps even a transcript - be 
made available under certain circumstances, e.g. the Federal Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b 
(1995). In this situation, only the records would be excepted from the privilege, however. 
4. Section 6(a)(3). Threats of bodily injury or to commit a crime of violence. 
The policy rationales supporting the privilege do not support mediation communications 
that threaten bodily injury or crimes of violence. To the contrary, in cases in which a credible 
threat has been made disclosure would serve the public interest in safety and the protection of 
others. Because such statements are sometimes made in anger with no intention to commit the 
act, the exception is a narrow one that applies only to the threatening statements; the remainder 
of the mediation communication remains protected against disclosure. 
State mediation confidentiality statutes frequently recognize a similar exception. See 
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Alaska Stat. Section 47.12.450(e) (1998) (community dispute resolution centers) (admissible to 
extent relevant to a criminal matter); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 13-22-307 (1998) (general) (bodily 
injury); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(5) (1999) (domestic relations) (mediator may report 
threats of violence to court); Or. Rev. Stat. Section 36.220(6) (1997) (general) (substantial bodily 
injury to specific person); 42 Pa. Cons. St. Ann. Section 5949(2)(1) (1996) (general) (threats of 
bodily injury); Wash. Rev. Code Section 7.75.050 (1984) (community dispute resolution centers) 
(threats of bodily injury); Wyo. Stat. Section 1-43-103 (c)(ii) (1991) (general) (future crime or 
harmful act). 
5. Section 6(a)(4). Communications used to plan or commit a crime. 
The policies underlying this provision mirror those underlying Section 5(c), and are 
discussed there. This exception applies to particular communications used to plan or commit a 
crime, whereas Section 5(c) applies when the mediation is used for these purposes. It includes 
communication intentionally used to conceal an ongoing crime or criminal activity. 
Almost a dozen States currently have mediation confidentiality protections that contain 
exceptions related to a commission of a crime. Colo. Rev Stat. Section 13-22-307 (1991) 
(general) (future felony); Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 723.038 (mobile home parks) (ongoing or future 
crime or fraud); Iowa Code Section 216.15B (1999) (civil rights); Iowa Code Section 654A.13 
(1990) (farmer-lender); Iowa Code Section 679C.2 (1998) (general) (ongoing or future crimes); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(3) (1989) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. Section 44-817(c)(3) (1996) (labor) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment) (ongoing and future crime or fraud); 24 Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 2857(2) (1999) (health care) (to prove fraud during mediation); Minn. 
Stat. Section 595.02(l)(a) (1996) (general); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2914 (1994) (general) 
(crime or fraud); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 328-C:9(Ill) (1998) (domestic relations) (perjury 
in mediation); N.J. Stat Ann. Section 34:13A-16(h) (1997) (workers' compensation) (any crime); 
N.Y. Lab. Laws Section 702-a(5) (McKinney 1991) (past crimes) (labor mediation); Or. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. Section 36.220(6) (1997) (general) (future bodily harm to a specific person); S.D. 
Codified Laws Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general) (crime or fraud); Wyo. Stat. Ann. Section 1 -
43-103(c)(ii) (1991) (future crime). 
While ready to exempt attempts to commit or the commission of crimes from 
confidentiality protection, the Drafting Committees declined to cover "fraud" that would not also 
constitute a crime because civil cases frequently include allegations of fraud, with varying 
degrees of merit, and the mediation would appropriately focus on discussion of fraud claims. 
Some state statutes do exempt fraud, although less frequently than they do crime. See, e.g., Fla. 
Stat. Ann. Section 723.038(8) (1994) (mobile home parks) (communications made in furtherance 
of commission of crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 23-605(b)(3) (1999) (domestic 
relations) (ongoing crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 44-817(c)(3) (1996) (labor) 
(ongoing crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-452(b)(3) (1964) (general) (ongoing or 
future crime or fraud); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 75-4332(d)(3) (1996) (public employment) 
(ongoing or future crime or fraud); Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 25-2914 (1994) (general) (crime or 
fraud); S.D. Codified Laws Section 19-13-32 (1998) (general) (crime or fraud). 
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Significantly, this exception does not cover mediation communications constituting 
admissions of past crimes, or past potential crimes, which remain privileged. Thus, for example, 
discussions of past aggressive positions with regard to taxation or other matters of regulatory 
compliance in commercial mediations remain privileged against possible use in subsequent or 
simultaneous civil proceedings. The Drafting Committees discussed the possibility of creating an 
exception for the related circumstance in which a party makes an admission of past conduct that 
portends future bad conduct. However, they decided against such an expansion of this exception 
because such past conduct can already be disclosed in other important ways. The other parties 
can warn others, because parties are not prohibited from disclosing by the Act. The Act permits 
the mediator to disclose if required by law to disclose felonies or if public policy requires. 
It is important to emphasize that the Act's limited focus as an evidentiary and discovery 
privilege, rather than a broader rule of confidentiality means that this privilege provision would 
not prevent a party from calling the police, or warning someone in danger. 
Finally, it should be noted that this exception is intended to prevent the abuse of the 
privilege as a shield to evidence that might be necessary to prosecute or defend a crime. The 
Drafters recognize that it is possible that the exception itself could be abused. Such unethical or 
bad faith conduct would continue to be subject to traditional sanction standards. 
6. Section 6(a)(5). Evidence of professional misconduct or malpractice by the 
mediator. 
The rationale behind the exception is that disclosures may be necessary to promote 
accountability of mediators by allowing for grievances to be brought against mediators, and as a 
matter of fundamental fairness, to permit the mediator to defend against such a claim. Moreover, 
permitting complaints against the mediator furthers the central rationale that States have used to 
reject the traditional basis of licensure and credentialing for assuring quality in professional 
practice: that private actions will serve an adequate regulatory function and sift out incompetent 
or unethical providers through liability and the rejection of service. See, e.g., W. Lee Dobbins, 
The Debate Over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure 
Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, U. Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 95, 96-98 
(1995). 
7. Section 6(a)(6). Evidence of professional misconduct or malpractice by a party or 
representative of a party. 
Sometimes the issue arises whether anyone may provide evidence of professional 
misconduct or malpractice occurring during the mediation. See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. 
App. 1990); see generally Pamela Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The 
Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation 
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 715, 
740-751. The failure to provide an exception for such evidence would mean that lawyers and 
fiduciaries could act unethically or in violation of standards without concern that evidence of the 
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misconduct would later be admissible in a proceeding brought for recourse. This exception 
makes it possible to use testimony of anyone except the mediator in proceedings at which such a 
claim is made or defended. Because of the potential adverse impact on a mediator's appearance 
of impartiality, the use of mediator testimony is more guarded, and therefore protected by 
Section 6(c). It is important to note that evidence fitting this exception would still be protected in 
other types of proceedings, such as those related to the dispute being mediated. 
Reporting requirements operate independently of the privilege and this exception. 
Mediators and other are not precluded by the Act from reporting misconduct to an agency or 
tribunal other than one that might make a ruling on the dispute being mediated, which is 
precluded by Section 8(a) and (b). 
8. Section 6(a)(7). Evidence of abuse or neglect. 
An exception for child abuse and neglect is common in domestic mediation 
confidentiality statutes, and the Act reaffirms these important policy choices States have made to 
protect their citizens. See, e.g., Iowa. Code Ann. Section 679c.3(4) (1998) (general); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. Section 23-605(b)(2) (1999) (domestic relations); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 38-1522(a) 
(1997) (general); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 44-817© )(2) (1996) (labor); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 
72-5427(e)(2) (1996) (teachers); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 75-4332(d)(l) (1996) (public 
employment); Minn. Stat. Ann. Section 595.02(2)(a)(5) (1996) (general); Mont. Code Ann. 
Section 41-3-404 (1999) (child abuse investigations) (mediator may not be compelled to testify); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 43-2908 (1993) (parenting act) (in camera); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 
328-C:9(IIl)(c ) (1998) (marital); N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 7A-38.1(L) (1999) (superior court); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 7A-38.4(K) (1999) (district courts); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 
3109.052(c) (West 1990) (child custody); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 5123.601 (West 1988) 
(mental retardation); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2317.02 (1998) (general); Or. Rev. Stat. 
Section 36.220(5) (1997) (general); Tenn. Code Ann. Section 36-4-130(b)(5) (1993) (divorce); 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-38(4) (2000) (divorce) (mediator shall report); Va. Code Ann. 
Section 63.1-248.3(A)(10) (2000) (welfare); Wis. Stat. Section 48.981(2) (1997) (social 
services): Wis. Stat. Section 904.085(4)(d) (1997) (general); Wyo. Stat. Section l-43-103(c)(iii) 
(1991) (general). But see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 8-807(B) (West 1998) (child abuse 
investigations) (rejecting rule of disclosure). 
By referring to "child and adult protective services agency," the exception broadens the 
coverage to include the elderly and disabled if that State has protected them by statute and has 
created an agency enforcement process. It should be stressed that this exception applies only to 
permit disclosures in public agency proceedings in which the agency is a party or nonparty 
participant. The exception does not apply in private actions, such as divorce, because the need 
for the evidence is not as great as in proceedings brought to protect against abuse and neglect so 
that the harm can be stopped, and is outweighed by the policy of promoting candor during 
mediation. For example, in a mediation between Husband and Wife who are seeking a divorce, 
Husband admits to sexually abusing a child. Husband's admission would not be privileged in an 
action brought by the public agency to protect the child, but would be privileged in the divorce 
hearings. 
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The last bracketed phrases make an exception to the exception to privilege of mediation 
communications in certain mediations involving such public agencies. Child protection agencies 
in many States have created mediation programs to resolve issues that arise because of 
allegations of abuse. Those advocating the use of mediation in these contexts point to the need 
for privilege to promote the use of the process, and these alternatives provide it. National 
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improving the Child Abuse 
and Neglect Court Process, 1995. These alternatives are bracketed and offered to the states as 
recommended model provisions because of concerns raised by some mediators of such cases that 
mediator testimony sometimes can be necessary and appropriate to secure the safety of a 
vulnerable party in a situation of abuse. See Letter from American Bar Association Commission 
on Mental and Physical Disability Law, November 15, 2000 (on file with Drafting Committees). 
The words "child or adult protection" are bracketed so that States using a different term 
or encouraging mediation of disputes arising from abuse of other protected classes can add 
appropriate language. 
Each state may chose to enact either Alternative A or Alternative B. The Alternative A 
exception only applies to cases referred by the court or public agency. In this situation, 
allegations already have been made in an official context and a court has made the determination 
that settlement of that case is in the public interest by referring it to mediation. In Alternative B 
exception, no court referral is required. A state enacting Alternative B would be adopting a 
policy that it is sufficient that the public agency favors settlement of a particular case by its 
participation in the mediation. 
The term "public agency" may have to be modified in a State in which a private agency is 
charged by law to assume the duties to protect children in these contexts. 
9. Section 6(b). Exceptions requiring demonstration of need. 
The exceptions under this Section constitute less common fact patterns that may 
sometimes justify carving an exception, but only when the unique facts and circumstances of the 
case demonstrate that the evidence is otherwise unavailable, and the need for the evidence 
outweighs the policies underlying the privilege. Thus, Section 6(b) effectively places the burden 
on the proponent to persuade the court on these points. The evidence will not be disclosed absent 
a finding on these points after an in camera hearing. Further, under Section 6(d) the evidence 
will be admitted only for that limited purpose. 
10. Section 6(b)(1). Felony [and misdemeanors]. 
As noted in the commentary to Section 6, point 5, the Act affords more specialized 
treatment for the use of mediation communications in subsequent felony proceedings, which 
reflects the unique character, considerations, and concerns that attend the need for evidence in 
the criminal process. States may also wish to extend this specialized treatment to misdemeanors, 
and the Drafters offer appropriate model language for states in that event. 
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Existing privilege statutes are silent or split as to whether they apply only to civil 
proceedings, apply also to some juvenile or misdemeanor proceedings, or apply as well to all 
criminal proceedings. The split among the States reflects clashing policy interests. One the one 
hand, mediation participants operating under the benefit of a privilege might reasonably expect 
that statements made in mediation would not be available for use in a later felony prosecution. 
The candor this expectation promotes is precisely that which the mediation privilege seeks to 
protect. It is also the basis upon which many criminal courts throughout the country have 
established victim-offender mediation programs, which have enjoyed great success in 
misdemeanor, and, increasingly, felony cases. See generally Nancy Hirshman, Mediating 
Misdemeanors: Big Successes in Smaller Cases, 7 Disp. Resol Mag. 12 (Fall 2000); Mark S. 
Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation (2001). Public policy, for example, 
specifically supports the mediation of gang disputes, and these programs may be less successful 
if the parties cannot discuss the criminal acts underlying the disputes. Cal. Penal Code Section 
13826.6 (West 1996) (mediation of gang-related disputes); Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 22-25-104.5 
(1994) (mediation of gang-related disputes). 
On the other hand, society's need for evidence to avoid an inaccurate decision is greatest 
in the criminal context - both for evidence that might convict the guilty and exonerate the 
innocent — because the stakes of human liberty and public safety are at their zenith. For this 
reason, even without this exception, the courts can be expected to weigh heavily the need for the 
evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule that the defendant's constitutional rights 
require disclosure. See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(juvenile's constitutional right to confrontation in civil juvenile delinquency trumps mediator's 
statutory right not to be called as a witness); State v. Castellano, 460 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1984) 
(statute excluding evidence of an offer of compromise presented to prove liability or absence of 
liability for a claim or its value does not preclude mediator from testifying in a criminal 
proceeding regarding alleged threat made by one party to another in mediation). See also Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
After great consideration and public comment, the Drafting Committees decided to leave 
the critical balancing of these competing interests to the sound discretion of the courts to 
determine under the facts and circumstances of each case. It is drafted in a manner to ensure that 
both the prosecution and the defense have the same right with respect to evidence, thus assuring 
a level playing field. In addition, it puts the parties on notice of this limitation on confidentiality. 
11. Section 6(b)(2). Validity and enforceability of settlement agreement 
This exception is designed to preserve traditional contract defenses to the enforcement of 
the mediated settlement agreement that relate to the integrity of the mediation process, which 
otherwise would be unavailable if based on mediation communications. A recent Texas case 
provides an example. An action was brought to enforce a mediated settlement. The defendant 
raised the defense of duress and sought to introduce evidence that he had asked the mediator to 
permit him to leave because of chest pains and a history of heart trouble, and that the mediator 
had refused to let him leave the mediation session. See Randle v. Mid Gulf Inc., No. 14-95-
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01292, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex App. 1996) (unpublished). The exception might also allow party 
testimony in a personal injury case that the driver denied having insurance, causing the plaintiff 
to rely and settle on that basis, where such a misstatement would be a basis for reforming or 
avoiding liability under the settlement. Under this exception the evidence will not be privileged 
if the weighing requirements are met. This exception differs from the exception for a record of 
an agreement in Section 6(a)(1) in that Section 6(a)(1) only exempts the admissibility of the 
record of the agreement itself, while the exception in Section 6(b)(2) is broader in that it would 
permit the admissibility of other mediation communications that are necessary to establish or 
refute a defense to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement. 
12. Section 6(c). Mediator not compelled. 
Section 6(c) allows the mediator to decline to testify or otherwise provide evidence in a 
professional misconduct and mediated settlement enforcement cases to protect against frequent 
attempts to use the mediator as a tie-breaking witness, which would undermine the integrity of 
the mediation process and the impartiality of the individual mediator. Nonetheless, the parties 
and others may testify or provide evidence in such cases. 
This Section is discussed in the comments to Sections 6(a)(7) and 6(b)(2). The mediator 
may still testify voluntarily if the exceptions apply, or the parties waive their privilege, but the 
mediator may not be compelled to do so. 
13. Section 6(d). Limitations on exceptions. 
This Section makes clear the limited use that may be made of mediation communications 
that are admitted under the exceptions delineated in Sections 6(a) and 6(b). For example, if a 
statement evidencing child abuse is admitted at a proceeding to protect the child, the rest of the 
mediation communications remain privileged for that proceeding, and the statement of abuse 
itself remains privileged for the pending divorce or other proceedings. 
SECTION 7. PROHIBITED MEDIATOR REPORTS. 
(a) Except as required in subsection (b), a mediator may not make a report, assessment, 
evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to a court, 
administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on the dispute that is the subject 
of the mediation. 
(b) A mediator may disclose: 
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was 
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Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai 
Conn.Super.,2006. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of 
Litchfield. 
SHARON MOTOR LODGE, INC. et al. 
v. 
Allan Y. TAI. 
No. CV980077828S. 
March 1,2006. 
Background: Corporate client and its officers sued 
attorney for legal malpractice. After plaintiffs filed 
a motion for judgment on the settlement in the 
amount of $365,000 plus interest and motion for 
determination was granted to the extent that it 
allowed the parties to direct two interrogatories to 
the mediator, plaintiffs filed motion for an order to 
permit them to take deposition and/or testimony of 
mediator as to issues presented in counts added in 
amended complaint. 
Holdings: The Superior Court, Judicial District of 
Litchfield, Bozzuto, J., held that: 
(1) previous determinations regarding whether 
parties could introduce testimony of mediator into 
evidence would not be treated as the law of the case 
relative to present motion to depose mediator; 
(2) subpoena duces tecum that law firm filed 
approximately four years earlier did not satisfy 
requirements of statute providing that 
communications during a mediation were 
discoverable if parties agreed in writing to 
disclosure; and 
(3) interest of justice outweighed the need for 
confidentiality of mediation proceedings. 
Motion granted. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Courts 106 €==>99(5) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and 
Procedure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(5) k. Trial or Evidence, 
Rulings Relating To. Most Cited Cases 
Superior court would decline to treat its previous 
determinations regarding whether parties could 
introduce testimony of mediator into evidence as 
the law of the case relative to present motion of 
corporate client and its officers to depose mediator 
as to issues presented in counts added in amended 
complaint; new and overriding circumstances 
existed in that client and officers were previously 
seeking to summarily enforce settlement agreement, 
which required them to provide evidence that terms 
of agreement were clear and unambiguous, while 
existence of agreement was put at issue by 
allegations that law firm breached settlement 
agreement. 
[2] Witnesses 410 €==>196.4 
410 Witnesses 
41 Oil Competency 
41011(D) Confidential Relations and 
Privileged Communications 
410k 196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations 
in General 
410k 196.4 k. Other Miscellaneous 
Relations. Most Cited Cases 
Subpoena duces tecum that law firm filed 
approximately four years earlier was too remote in 
time to the proposed disclosure to satisfy 
requirements of statute providing that 
communications received or obtained during a 
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mediation were discoverable if parties agreed in 
writing to disclosure. C.G.S.A. § 52-235d(b)(l). 
[3] Witnesses 410 €=^196.4 
410 Witnesses 
41 Oil Competency 
41011(D) Confidential Relations and 
Privileged Communications 
410k 196 Fiduciary or Contract Relations 
in General 
410k 196.4 k. Other Miscellaneous 
Relations. Most Cited Cases 
Interest of justice, arising from client's substantial 
need to elicit testimony of mediator to obtain 
evidence relating essential elements of claim that 
law firm breached settlement agreement, 
outweighed the need for confidentiality of 
mediation proceedings that resulted in settlement. 
C.G.S.A. § 52-235d(b)(4). 
Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Torrington, Gallagher Law 
Firm, New Haven, and Ouellette Deganis & 
Gallagher LLC, Cheshire, for Sharon Motor Lodge, 
Inc. 
Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Torrington, for Yoke Kiew 
Chau and Chia Peng Chiang. 
Michael William Coffey, Wilson Elser, White 
Plains, for Allan Y. Tai.BOZZUTO, J. 
1 
*1 The above-referenced case is, in part, a legal 
malpractice action. The issue presently before the 
court is whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to 
take the deposition of or elicit the testimony from 
the judge magistrate who conducted confidential 
mediation sessions between the parties relative to 
the original malpractice action. The purpose of 
eliciting testimony from the mediator is to 
determine whether he believed that a settlement 
agreement between the parties had been achieved 
during the course of the mediation sessions. For the 
reasons set forth below, the court grants the 
plaintiffs motion. 
II 
© 2007 Thomson/West. N< 
Page 2 
Conn. L. Rptr. 852 
In 1998, the plaintiffs, Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. 
and its two officers, Yoke Kiew Chau and Chia 
Peng Chiang, commenced this action against the 
defendant, Allan Y. Tai, an attorney who 
represented them in the purchase of the Sharon 
Motor Lodge. In their complaint the plaintiffs allege 
that, after they purchased the motor lodge, it 
sustained physical damage as a result of flooding, 
and that the defendant committed malpractice by 
failing to conduct a title search that would have 
included an inquiry into whether the property was 
located in a flood zone, in failing to recommend 
that they obtain a professional inspection of the 
septic system and pool on the premises, and by not 
disclosing that he was not licensed to practice in 
Connecticut and was not knowledgeable as to 
Connecticut real estate law and procedures. 
The record reveals that after litigation began, the 
parties entered into non-binding mediation in which 
United States Magistrate Judge Owen Eagan acted 
as the mediator. The parties signed a confidentiality 
agreement, as they were required to do in order to 
enter into the mediation. The pctrties disagree as to 
whether the defendant's attorney was authorized to 
settle the case, and if so, for what amount. The 
plaintiffs allege that the defendant's attorney 
represented that he had authority to settle, and that, 
at the second mediation session, on May 23, 2001, 
the parties reached a settlement in the amount of 
$365,000. The defendant disagrees, contending that 
his attorney did not have authority to enter into a 
settlement on behalf of his malpractice insurance 
carrier and that, therefore, the parties did not reach 
a settlement. 
On July 13, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion for 
judgment on the settlement in the amount of 
$365,000 plus interest. In August 2001, they filed a 
motion for determination in which they asked the 
court to determine whether an agreement had been 
reached, and sought the disclosure of the results of 
the mediation sessions from the mediator. The court 
granted the motion for determination on December 
3, 2001, to the extent that it allowed the parties to 
direct two interrogatories to the mediator. Sharon 
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, Superior Court, judicial 
district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 98 0077828 
(December 3, 2001, Cremins, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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753, 755). The mediator answered the 
interrogatories, indicating that he thought the parties 
had reached an agreement to settle the case for 
$365,000. An evidentiary hearing followed on May 
16, 2002, in which the defendant argued that the 
mediator's understanding of the settlement was the 
result of a miscommunication, and both the 
defendant's attorney and a representative of his 
malpractice insurance carrier denied that they had 
reached a settlement with the plaintiffs. 
*2 On June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion 
asking the court to order the mediator to testify. The 
court, Cremins, J., denied both the plaintiffs' motion 
for judgment and their motion to order the 
testimony of the mediator. As to the former, the 
court ruled that it would not enforce the terms of the 
alleged settlement agreement because of the 
disagreement over its existence. The plaintiffs 
appealed the trial court's decisions on these 
motions. The Appellate Court found that the trial 
court's ruling on the motion for judgment was not a 
final judgment and, therefore, dismissed the appeal. 
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 82 Conn.App. 
148, 842 A.2d 1140, cert, denied, 269 Conn. 908, 
852A.2d738(2004).FN1 
FN1. Because 
concluded that the 
plaintiffs' motion 
final judgment, 
plaintiffs' claim 
improperly denied 
the mediator to 
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 
152 n. 5,842 A.2d 
the Appellate Court 
trial court's denial of the 
for judgment was not a 
it did not reach the 
that the trial court 
their motion to compel 
testify. Sharon Motor 
supra, 82 Conn.App. at 
1140. 
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a 
request to amend their initial complaint to add five 
counts in which they allege that the parties reached 
a settlement agreement and the defendant breached 
the agreement. The defendant filed an objection to 
the request to amend, which was overruled by the 
court, Pickard, J. 
On October 17, 2005, the plaintiffs filed the motion 
that is presently before the court, i.e, a motion for 
an order to permit them to take the deposition 
and/or testimony of the mediator as to the issues 
presented in the counts that they added in the 
amended complaint. The plaintiffs contend that the 
mediator's testimony is relevant, material and 
probative as to the issues, is permitted by the 
exceptions outlined in General Statutes § 52-235d(b) 
, and that the interest of justice calls for this order 
so that the court may utilize all rational means for 
ascertaining the truth. The defendant objects to the 
motion on the ground that the information that the 
plaintiffs seek is not discoverable under § 52-235d. 
Ill 
[1] The first issue is whether the doctrine of the law 
of the case is implicated in the court's consideration 
of the present motion. As previously noted, in 2001, 
the plaintiffs filed a motion for determination in 
which they asked the court to permit them to obtain 
disclosure of the results of the mediation from the 
mediator on the grounds that such disclosure was 
warranted under § 52-235d(b)(2), (3) and (4). The 
defendant opposed the motion on policy grounds 
and on the ground that the statutory exceptions 
upon which the plaintiffs relied did not apply. The 
court, noting that case law interpreting the statute 
was "sparse," engaged in its own statutory 
interpretation. Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 
supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. The court 
concluded that "pursuant to § 52-235d(b)(4) ... in 
the interest of justice, the need for the disclosure of 
relevant communications made during the 
mediation outweighs the parties' need for 
confidentiality in order to determine whether a 
settlement agreement was reached at the mediation." 
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. 
L. Rptr. at 755. The court granted the motion to the 
extent that it permitted the plaintiffs to direct two 
interrogatories to the mediator. Id.™2 
FN2. Specifically, the court stated: "The 
plaintiffs' motion for determination is 
granted limited to the submission of the 
following interrogatories to the Honorable 
F. Owen Eagan: 
(1) Is it your understanding that the parties 
in the matter of Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. 
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et al. v. Allan Y. Tai, mediated before you 
on April 12, 2001 and on May 23, 2001 
reached an agreement ending their lawsuit. 
Yes No 
(2) If the answer to question (1) is yes, 
what was your understanding as to the 
terms of the settlement agreement." 
*3 The mediator responded to the interrogatories, 
indicating that he understood that the parties had 
reached a settlement. Nevertheless, the defendant 
continued to maintain that they had not. The 
plaintiffs then filed a motion asking the court to 
order the mediator to testify. The court, Cremins, J., 
denied the motion without issuing a written decision 
thereon. The court then denied the plaintiffs' motion 
for judgment on the settlement on the basis that the 
parties disagreed as to whether they had reached a 
settlement. The plaintiffs appealed both decisions. 
Although the Appellate Court did not reach the 
issue of whether the trial court properly denied the 
motion to order the mediator to testify, it did 
discuss the trial court's order, noting that the trial 
court "had to decide, in its discretion, whether 
further disclosure by the mediator [beyond the two 
interrogatories] was required 'as a result of 
circumstances' and whether the 'interest of justice 
outweighs the need for confidentiality, consistent 
with the principles of law/ General Statutes § 
52-235d(b)(4). The court, at a hearing, was able to 
discern the circumstances of the alleged settlement 
and could assess the credibility of the testimony 
proffered. The court found that the testimony of the 
mediator should not be ordered." Sharon Motor 
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 82 Conn.App. at 160, 842 
A.2d 1140. The Appellate Court also stated that, in 
denying the order, the trial court "impliedly [found] 
that 'as a result of the circumstances,' it did not 
find lthat the interest of justice outweighs the need 
for confidentiality' of the mediator's testimony. 
General Statutes § 52-235d(b)(4)." Sharon Motor 
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 82 Conn.App. at 153, 842 
A.2d 1140. Thus, this court has twice determined, at 
least by implication, that the mediator should not be 
ordered to testify under the "interest of justice" 
exception of § 52-235d(b)(4). 
Under the doctrine of the law of the case, "[w]here 
a matter has previously been ruled upon 
interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding 
in the case may treat that decision as the law of the 
case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was 
correctly decided, in the absence of some new or 
overriding circumstance." Breen v. Phelps, 186 
Conn. 86, 99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982). Under this 
doctrine, absent "new or overriding circumstances" 
the court has the discretion to treat its earlier 
decisions on the same issue in the matter as the law 
of the case. Wasko v. Manella, 87 Conn.App. 390, 
396, 865 A.2d 1223 (2005). On the other hand, if 
new or overriding circumstances do exist, the court 
should consider a party's subsequent motions 
pertaining to an issue that it has previously 
considered. Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 
259 Conn. 114, 131, 788 A.2d 83 (2002). 
In the present matter, new and overriding 
circumstances exist in that the plaintiffs were 
previously seeking to summarily enforce the 
settlement agreement, which required them to 
provide evidence that the terms of the agreement 
were "clear and unambiguous." Audubon Parking 
Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, 
Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993). 
Since that time, the plaintiffs have amended their 
complaint to include allegations that the defendant 
breached the settlement agreement, and the 
defendant has filed an answer denying these 
allegations. Therefore, the existence of the 
agreement is at issue. 
*4 Moreover, in their previous motions, the 
plaintiffs asked the court to order the mediator to 
testify and "to admit evidence from the mediation ... 
" Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. 
L. Rptr. at 754. In the present motion, they seek the 
court's permission to depose the mediator "as to the 
limited issues presented by trial of Counts 3-7 of the 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint." As the Supreme 
Court has noted, "[e]vidence may be elicited at a 
discovery deposition even though 'the information 
sought will be inadmissible at trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' 
Practice Book § 218 [now § 13-2]. Thus the 
allowable scope of inquiry at a discovery deposition 
clearly exceeds the boundaries of admissible 
evidence." Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, 
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Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139,491 A.2d 389 (1985). 
Given the new circumstances, this court declines to 
treat the trial court's previous determinations 
regarding whether the parties can introduce the 
testimony of the mediator into evidence as the law 
of the case relative to the plaintiffs' present motion 
to depose the mediator. 
"Our rules of practice provide guidelines to 
facilitate the discovery of information relevant to a 
pending suit." Sanderson v. Steve Snyder 
Enterprises, Inc., supra, 196 Conn, at 139, 491 
A.2d 389. Practice Book § 13-2 defines the scope 
of discovery as follows: "In any civil action ... 
where the judicial authority finds it reasonably 
probable that evidence outside the record will be 
required, a party may obtain in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter discovery of information .. 
. material to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, which [is] not privileged, whether 
the discovery or disclosure relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, and which [is] 
within the knowledge, possession or power of the ... 
person to whom the discovery is addressed. 
Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure 
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or 
defense of the action and it can be provided by the 
disclosing ... person with substantially greater 
facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the 
party seeking disclosure. It shall not be ground for 
objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence ..." 
Our Supreme Court "[has] long recognized that the 
granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the 
sound discretion of the [trial] court ..." (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Accessory 
Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 156, 
757 A.2d 14 (2000). "That discretion is limited, 
however, by the provisions of the rules pertaining to 
discovery; Practice Book §§ 217-21 [now §§ 13-2 
to 13-5]; especially the mandatory provision that 
discovery 'shall be permitted if the disclosure 
sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or 
defense of the action ...' (Emphasis added.) Practice 
Book § 218 [now § 13-2]. The court's discretion 
applies to decisions concerning whether the 
information is material [or] privileged ... as stated in 
[§ 13-2]. A complete denial of discovery, however, 
is seldom within the court's discretion unless the 
court finds that one or more of the limitations on 
discovery expressed above applies." Standard 
Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57-60, 459 
A.2d 503 (1983). 
*5 One category of information that is generally 
exempt, or privileged, from being discovered is 
information regarding non-court-ordered mediation. 
General Statutes § 52-235d, which governs this 
issue, provides in relevant part: "(b) Except as 
provided in this section, by agreement of the 
parties, or in furtherance of settlement discussions, 
a person not affiliated with either party to a lawsuit, 
an attorney for one of the parties or any other 
participant in a mediation shall not voluntarily 
disclose or, through discovery or compulsory 
process, be required to disclose any oral or written 
communication received or obtained during the 
course of a mediation, unless (1) each of the parties 
agrees in writing to such disclosure, (2) the 
disclosure is necessary to enforce a written 
agreement that came out of the mediation, (3) the 
disclosure is required by statute or regulation, or by 
any court, after notice to all parties to the 
mediation, or (4) the disclosure is required as a 
result of circumstances in which a court finds that 
the interest of justice outweighs the need for 
confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law. 
"(c) Any disclosure made in violation of any 
provision of this section shall not be admissible in 
any proceeding." 
"(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent (1) the 
discovery or admissibility of any evidence that is 
otherwise discoverable merely because such 
evidence was presented during the course of the 
mediation ..." 
The plaintiffs argue that the court should grant their 
motion for the following reasons: 1) the mediator's 
testimony is required in that the interest of justice 
calls for his testimony under the common law, and 
this interest outweighs the need for confidentiality, 
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as provided for in § 52-23 5d(b)(4); 2) the 
mediator's testimony is relevant material and 
probative on the issue of whether there was a 
settlement and, if so, what the terms of that 
settlement were; and 3) both parties have agreed in 
writing to the disclosure, as provided in § 
52-235d(b)(l) in that both parties have, at different 
times, sought to compel the mediator's testimony. 
The defendant opposes the motion on the grounds 
that requiring the mediator's testimony would 
violate the principles of confidentiality and his 
testimony is not discoverable under any of the 
exceptions provided for in § 52-235d(b). 
Little guidance exists in Connecticut case law as to 
the use of the statutory privilege contained in § 
52-235d(b) or the exceptions thereto. Our Supreme 
and Appellate Courts have not addressed this 
precise issue. Although judges of this court and the 
federal district court have done so, the decisions in 
which they addressed these issues are not instructive 
as to the scope of the privilege or the exceptions. FN3 
As such, this court has closely analyzed the 
subject statute in an effort to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. 
FN3. In Moore v. Lieberman, Superior 
Court, judicial district of Middlesex at 
Middletown, Docket No. CV 98 0087620 
(April 23, 2001, Gilardi, J.), the court, in 
rendering a decision on the plaintiffs 
motion to summarily enforce a settlement 
agreement, considered documents that had 
been received or obtained during the 
course of mediation. In response to the 
defendants' argument that § 52-23 5d 
prohibited the court from considering the 
documents, the court found that they had 
waived the statutory protection by 
submitting the documents to the court and 
that "in the interests of justice, [the] court's 
need for the materials outweighs the 
parties' need for confidentiality in order to 
determine whether an unambiguous 
settlement agreement exists." Moore v. 
Lieberman, supra, Superior Court, Docket 
No. CV 98 0087620, n. 4. In making its 
determination, however, the court did not 
further explore or articulate the reasons 
that contributed to its decision. Id. 
Therefore, Moore is of little assistance in 
determining the contours of the relevant 
exception. 
In New Horizon Financial Services, LLC 
v. First Financial Equities, Inc., 278 
F.Sup.2d 259, 263 (D.Conn.2003), in 
which the plaintiff sought summary 
enforcement of a settlement agreement, the 
federal district court granted the plaintiffs 
request to call the mediator to testify at an 
evidentiary hearing. The court relied on 
this court's decision granting the plaintiffs' 
motion for determination, see Sharon 
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. 
L. Rptr. at 753, and concluded that " 
pursuant to § 52-235d(b)(4), 'disclosure is 
required as a result of circumstances in 
which a court finds that the interest of 
justice outweighs the need for 
confidentiality, consistent with the 
principles of law' ..." New Horizon 
Financial Services, LLC v. First Financial 
Equities, Inc., supra, 278 F.Supp. at 263. 
The court did not, however, detail the 
reasons that led to its determination. 
Therefore, New Horizon Financial 
Services, LLC, does not provide guidance 
as to the issue presented here. 
"In undertaking this analysis, we are mindful that, 
as with any claim of privilege, a statutory privilege 
has the effect of withholding relevant information 
from the factfinder ... Accordingly, although a 
statutory privilege must be applied so as to 
effectuate its purpose, it is to be applied cautiously 
and with circumspection because it impedes the 
truth-seeking function of the adjudicative process." 
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251 
Conn. 790, 819, 742 A.2d 322 (1999) (discussing 
statutory privileges accorded to certain medical 
records). 
*6 "It is well settled that in construing statutes, [the 
court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and 
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... 
and that 4[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first 
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instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute 
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after 
examining such text and considering such 
relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and 
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or 
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the 
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.' 
General Statutes § l-2z." (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Alexson v. Foss, 276 Conn. 599, 604-05, 
887 A.2d 872 (2006). "The test to determine 
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in 
context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Alexson v. Foss, supra, 276 Conn, at 605, 887 A.2d 
872. 
communications received or obtained during a 
mediation is discoverable if the parties agree in 
writing to the disclosure. It is reasonable to 
conclude that, given the general intent of the statute, 
this exception applies to previously undisclosed 
communications if the parties expressly agree to the 
disclosure and their agreement is reasonably near in 
time to the proposed disclosure.FN4 Here, the 
written document that the plaintiffs rely on is a 
subpoena duces tecum that the defendant filed 
approximately four years ago. This document does 
not satisfy the requirements of this exception 
because it is too remote in time to the proposed 
disclosure. 
Previously in this case, in deciding the plaintiffs' 
motion for determination, the court engaged in a 
statutory interpretation of § 52-235d(b) and 
concluded that its purpose was to ensure the 
confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution 
proceedings involved in non-court-ordered 
mediation. Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 
30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. This conclusion is 
consistent with both the plain language of the 
statute and its legislative history. See 41 H.R. Proc, 
Pt. 5, 1998 Sess., p. 1425, remarks of 
Representative Michael P. Lawlor ("[tjhis bill 
simply clarifies that voluntary disclosure made 
during the course of a mediation which is not court 
ordered is not subject to further disclosure in court. 
In other words, it allows for confidential mediations 
to take place"). It is also consistent with the theory 
that provisions for ensuring the confidentiality of 
alternative dispute resolution proceedings will 
encourage parties to use these measures. See State 
Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom oj 
information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 500, 709 
A.2d 1129 (1999) ("requiring proceedings before 
the mediation board to be open to the public would 
create a significant deterrent to parties considering 
arbitration before the mediation board. This, in turn, 
would work to defeat the legislature's goal of 
providing low cost arbitration services as an 
effective alternative to private arbitrators to 
facilitate the resolution of labor disputes"). 
[2] Turning to the first exception at issue, the plain 
language of § 52-235d(b)(l) provides that 
FN4. See Section 5(a) of the Uniform 
Mediation Act, which provides in relevant 
part: "A privilege [of confidentiality of 
mediation communications] may be 
waived in a record or orally during a 
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all 
parties to the mediation and: (1) in the case 
of the privilege of the mediator, it is 
expressly waived by the mediator ..." 
National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, Uniform Mediation 
Act, Section 5(a), "Waiver and Preclusion 
of Privilege." (2003). As the reporter 
comments, "[significantly ... the 
mediation privilege does not permit waiver 
to be implied by conduct ... The rationale 
for requiring explicit waiver is to 
safeguard against the possibility of 
inadvertent waiver ..." Id, comment 1. 
*7 [3] As to the other exception that the plaintiffs 
rely upon, i.e., § 52-235d(b)(4), its language is plain 
and unambiguous to the extent that it does not, 
unlike mediation confidentiality provisions in other 
jurisdictions, categorically bar a party from 
obtaining the testimony of a mediator. See, e.g., 
Cal. Evid.Code § 703.5 (except in very limited 
circumstances, "no ... mediator ... shall be 
competent to testify, in any subsequent civil 
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, 
or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the 
prior proceeding"). 
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More to the point, however, the language of the 
statute is not plain and unambiguous in that it does 
not provide guidance for determining the 
circumstance in which "the interest of justice" will 
outweigh "the need for confidentiality, consistent 
with the principles of law." The plaintiffs' 
contention, that such circumstances exist where, as 
in the present case, the matter before the court 
involves claims that are premised upon allegations 
that the defendant agreed to a settlement in the 
course of the mediation and then breached the 
agreement is reasonable, but so is the defendant's 
argument that allowing for disclosures in such 
circumstances might undermine the policy of 
encouraging parties to engage in alternative dispute 
resolution. In order to determine the parameters of 
this exception, the court will "look for interpretive 
guidance to the legislative history and 
circumstances surrounding [the statute's] enactment, 
to the legislative policy it was designed to 
implement, and to its relationship to existing 
legislation and common law principles governing 
the same general subject matter ..." (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Manhattan 
Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 
597 (2005). 
First, and again as previously noted in this case, the 
legislative history of § 52-235d(b) does not clarify 
the intent of the legislature in crafting the 
exceptions contained therein. Sharon Motor Lodge, 
Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 754. To the 
extent that the general intent of the statute is to " 
[preserve] the candidness of discussions that take 
place during mediation and [to maintain] the 
integrity and confidentiality of the mediation process 
"; id., at 753; its intent is similar to the policies 
underlying the attorney-client and attorney work 
product privileges.™5 See National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform 
Mediation Act (Uniform Mediation Act), Section 4 " 
Privilege Against Disclosure; Admissibility; 
Discovery," Reporter's Comment 4(a)(2), (2003) (" 
the mediation privilege of the parties draws upon 
the purpose, rationale, and traditions of the 
attorney-client privilege, in that its paramount 
justification is to encourage candor by the 
mediation parties, just as encouraging the client's 
candor is the central justification of the 
attorney-client privilege"). See also Alford v. 
Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916921-22 
(Tex.Civ.App.2004), cert, denied, 2005 Tex. 
LEXIS 375 (Tex.2005) (privilege accorded 
confidential mediation communications analyzed in 
accordance with standards applicable to 
attorney-client privilege). 
FN5. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 
36, 52, 730 A.2d 51 (1999) 
(attorney-client privilege "created to 
encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in 
the observation of law and administration 
of justice" [internal quotation marks 
omitted] ); and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 510-11, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 
451 (1947) (work product privilege 
premised on policy that "it is essential that 
a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion 
by opposing parties and their counsel ... 
[Absent the privilege] [inefficiency, 
unfairness and sharp practices would 
inevitably develop in the giving of legal 
advice and in the preparation of cases for 
trial ... And the interests of the clients and 
the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
"). 
*8 When § 52-235d(b) is considered in conjunction 
with these privileges, the exception recognized in § 
52-235d(b)(4) appears to be similar to the "at issue" 
exception to the privilege that is accorded to 
attorney-client communications under common law 
and to the "substantial need" exception to the 
privilege accorded to attorney work product under 
Practice Book § 13-3(a). The parameters of these 
exceptions, therefore, provide guidance in deciding 
the scope of § 52-235d(b)(4).FN6 
FN6. The exception recognized in § 
52-235d(b)(4) is also similar to § 4-8 of 
the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which 
provides: "(a) General rule. Evidence of an 
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offer to compromise or settle a disputed 
claim is inadmissable on the issues of 
liability and the amount of the claim, (b) 
Exceptions. This rule does not require the 
exclusion of: (1) Evidence that is offered 
for another purpose, such as proving bias 
or prejudice of a witness ... or (2) 
statements of fact or admissions of liability 
made by a party." Although, as a court in 
another jurisdiction noted, "[t]he 
confidentiality protections of [the 
mediation confidentiality statute] are 
broader than the exclusionary rule set forth 
in rule [4-8] ... similar policy concerns 
underlie both provisions." Avary v. Bank 
of America, N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 798 
(Tex.Civ.App.2002), cert. denied, 
(Tex.2003). Like the mediation privilege, 
the general rule that evidence of attempts 
to settle an action is not admissible " 
reflects the strong public policy of 
promoting settlement of disputes." Miko v. 
Commission on Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 209, 596 
A.2d 396 (1991). 
Indeed, in his motion to strike the 
plaintiffs' claims relating to the settlement 
agreement, the defendant argued that 
evidence regarding these claims is 
inadmissible pursuant to § 4-8(a). As the 
court noted in denying the defendant's 
motion, "[t]his ground is not well-founded. 
The five counts all allege that an actual 
agreement was reached. The evidence to 
which the defendant objects will not be 
offered for the purpose of establishing 
liability in the case in chief or on the issue 
of the amount of the claim. Evidence will 
be offered on the issue of whether the 
parties reached an enforceable agreement 
to settle their claim ... The essential issue 
in the five new counts is ... breach of 
contract. Proof of these counts will be by 
the normal fair preponderance of the 
evidence. Section 4-8(a) does not preclude 
the prosecution of these counts." Sharon 
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, Superior Court, 
judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 
CV 98 0077828 (December 14, 2004, 
Page 9 
Conn. L. Rptr. 852 
Pickard, J.). 
Generally, "[exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege should be made only when the reason for 
disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of 
essential communications." Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 
52, 730 A.2d 51 (1999). Specifically, "[b]ecause of 
the important public policy considerations that 
necessitated the creation of the attorney-client 
privilege, the 'at issue/ or implied waiver, 
exception is invoked only when the content of the 
legal advice is integral to the outcome of the legal 
claims of the action ... Such is the case when a party 
specifically pleads reliance on an attorney's advice 
as an element of a claim or defense ... or 
specifically places at issue, in some other manner, 
the attorney-client relationship. In those instances 
the party has waived the right to confidentiality by 
placing the content of the attorney's advice directly 
at issue because the issue cannot be determined 
without an examination of that advice." (Citation 
omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at 52-53, 730 A.2d 51 
FN7 
FN7. The court cautioned that "[m]erely 
because the communications are relevant 
does not place them at issue." 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 249 Conn, 
at 54, 730 A.2d 51. In addition, u[w]hen 
privileged communications are not at issue, 
the opposing party cannot destroy the 
attorney-client privilege by merely 
claiming a need for the documents. It 
would be inconsistent with the nature and 
purpose of the [attorney-client] privilege to 
make an exception to the privilege based 
only on the unavailability of information 
from other sources." (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) Id, at 56-57, 730 A.2d 51. 
As to the attorney work product privilege, Practice 
Book § 13-3(a), provides that "a party may obtain 
discovery of documents and tangible things 
otherwise discoverable under Section 13-2 and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by 
or for another party or by or for that other party's 
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representative only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of the case and is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materials 
when the required showing has been made, the 
judicial authority shall not order disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation." FN8 
FN8. Despite the seemingly absolute 
nature of the privilege as it pertains to u 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions 
and legal theories of an attorney," our 
courts have determined that such materials 
may be discovered if they are "essential to 
the party's claim" and "could never be 
obtained by the [party] through any other 
legitimate means." Cloutier v. Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial 
district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 90 
0278184 (March 6, 1998, Mottolese, J.) 
(21 Conn. L. Rptr. 472, 474), affd per 
curiam, 60 Conn.App. 904, 759 A.2d 1056, 
cert, denied, 255 Conn. 919, 763 A.2d 
1040(2000). 
"Once a party has demonstrated that the material 
sought is work product, FN9 then the party seeking 
discovery has to make the requisite showing of both 
substantial need and undue hardship to obtain 
disclosure." Garcia v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, 
Docket No. CV 95 0373032 (July 2, 1999, Lager, 
J.) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 78, 79). " 'Substantial need' 
is established if the information contained in the 
documents is essential to the movant for example by 
containing the essential elements of a prima facie 
case, [6] J. Moore's Federal Practice ... § 26.70[5] 
[c] [3d ed.1997], or by containing facts that 
demonstrate the opposing party's knowledge. There 
is no substantial need when the documents contain 
material that is merely helpful but not essential ... or 
there are alternative means available to the movant 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
information." Garcia v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Conn. L. Rptr. 852 
supra, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. at 80. As to the second 
element, "[c]ourts have found undue hardship when 
a witness is unable to recall information contained 
in work product or is no longer available, or if the 
cost to obtain the equivalent information is 
unusually high." Id. Overall, "the inquiry ... is 
whether the necessity for the plaintiff to discover 
these materials outweighs the ... right to immunity 
from discovery." Cloutier v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, 
Docket No. CV 90 0278184 (March 6, 1998, 
Mottolese, J.) (21 Conn. L. Rptr. 472, 474), affd 
per curiam, 60 Conn.App. 904, 759 A.2d 1056, 
cert, denied, 255 Conn. 919, 763 A.2d 1040 (2000). 
FN9. "Work product can be defined as the 
result of an attorney's activities when those 
activities have been conducted with a view 
to pending or anticipated litigation." 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 714, 647 
A.2d 324 (1994). 
*9 Applying these standards to § 52-235d(b)(4), a 
party that seeks the disclosure of privileged 
mediation communications can obtain such material 
on the basis that disclosure is required in that "the 
interest of justice outweighs the need for 
confidentiality" if the party shows that it has a 
substantial need for the materials, i.e., that the 
materials are essential to its claims or defenses, that 
it would suffer undue hardship if the materials were 
not disclosed, and that these two considerations 
outweigh the interests of preserving the 
confidentiality of the communications. This 
standard balances "the public interest in protecting 
the confidentiality of the settlement process and 
countervailing interests, such as the right to every 
person's evidence." In re Anonymous, 283 P.3d 
627, 637 (4th Cir.2002). 
It is noteworthy that courts in other jurisdictions 
have applied similar standards in deciding whether 
information disclosed in mediation sessions is 
subject to disclosure. See id. (disclosure not 
allowed "unless the party seeking such disclosure 
can demonstrate that 'manifest injustice' will result 
from non-disclosure ... Application of the ... 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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standard requires the party seeking disclosure to 
demonstrate that the harm caused by non-disclosure 
will be manifestly greater than the harm caused by 
disclosure."); and State v. Williams, 184 N.J. 432, 
452-53, 877 A.2d 1258 (2005) (disclosure not 
allowed unless need for disclosure outweighs 
interest in protecting confidentiality, i.e., disclosure 
necessary to prove claim and evidence not 
otherwise available).™10 
FN 10. In addition, the most recent version 
of the Uniform Mediation Act provides an 
exception to the confidentiality of 
mediation communications "if a court ... 
finds, after a hearing in camera, that the 
party seeking discovery ... has shown that 
the evidence is not otherwise available, 
that there is a need for the evidence that 
substantially outweighs the interest in 
protecting confidentiality, and that the 
mediation communication is sought ... in ... 
a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or 
reform or a defense to avoid liability on a 
contract arising out of the mediation." 
Uniform Mediation Act supra, Section 6, " 
Exceptions to Privilege." 
In order to determine whether the plaintiffs have a 
substantial need for the testimony of the mediator, it 
is necessary to review the elements of their claims 
that the defendant breached the settlement 
agreement. "A settlement agreement is a contract 
that is interpreted according to general principles of 
contract law ... In Connecticut, a contract is binding 
if the parties mutually assent to its terms. Ubysz v. 
DiPietro, 185 Conn. 47, 51, 440 A.2d 830, 833 
(1981); see Johnson v. Schmitz, 237 F.Sup.2d 183, 
189 (D.Conn.2002) (applying this rule to settlement 
agreements). When both parties have mutually 
assented to a contract, the agreement is binding 
even if it is not signed. Schwarzschild v. Martin, 
191 Conn. 316, 321-22, 464 A.2d 774, 777 (1983); 
see Mil I gar d Corp. v. White Oak Corp., 224 
F.Sup.2d 425, 432 (D.Conn.2002) (applying this 
rule to settlement agreements) ." (Citations 
omitted.) Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 
432 F.3d 437, 443-44 (2d Cir.2005). 
On the other hand, "[t]he Connecticut Supreme 
Court has held that '[a] contract is not made so long 
as, in the contemplation of the parties, something 
remains to be done to establish the contractual 
relation.' Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76, 80, 347 
A.2d 58, 61 (1974). The parties' intent is 
determined from the (1) language used, (2) 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, 
including the motives of the parties, and (3) 
purposes which they sought to accomplish. Id; see 
Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 
Conn.App. 152, 160-61, 714 A.2d 21, 27 [cert, 
denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516] (1998) 
(same)." Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 
supra, 432 F.3d at 444. 
*10 It is arguable that the plaintiffs have a 
substantial need to elicit testimony of the mediator 
in order to obtain evidence relating to the first two 
factors, which are essential to their claims. 
Moreover, the question of the validity of the 
defendant's assertion that his attorney did not have 
the authority to settle the action is at issue, and it is 
apparent that evidence regarding any 
representations that the attorney or the parties may 
have made to the mediator regarding this issue is 
not available from other, unprivileged sources. 
In balancing these factors against the interest of 
maintaining the confidentiality of mediation 
proceedings, it is important to recognize that "[i]f 
mediation confidentiality is important, the 
appearance of mediator impartiality is imperative. A 
mediator, although neutral, often takes an active 
role in promoting candid dialogue ... To perform 
that function, a mediator must be able to instill the 
trust and confidence of the participants in the 
mediation process. That confidence is insured if the 
participants trust that information conveyed to the 
mediator will remain in confidence. Neutrality is the 
essence of the mediation process ... Thus, courts 
should be especially wary of mediator testimony 
because no matter how carefully presented, [it] will 
inevitably be characterized so as to favor one side 
or the other." (Citations omitted; emphasis in 
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. 
Williams, supra, 184 N.J. at 447-48, 877 A.2d 1258. 
On the other hand, as another court observed in 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Ori£. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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declining to recognize a mediator p r i v i l e g e , 1 " 
[w]hile confidentiality appears to be widely 
accepted in state law as a desirable component of 
the mediation process, there are legitimate 
countervailing interests to be accounted for in 
formulating a privilege that is invocable by a 
mediator, not the least of which is the venerable l 
right to every man's evidence.' " Smith v. Smith, 
154 F.R.D. 661, 671 (N.D.Tex. 1994). Furthermore, 
"[t]o accept as a given that the process of private 
party mediation should take place in confidence is 
not of itself sufficient to excuse a mediator from an 
obligation of disclosure upon the request of a 
disputant. When the question to be resolved is 
whether the mediator should have protected status, 
the balancing of competing interests will only 
properly take place in the context of the mediator, 
not of mediation in its broadest sense." Id, at 
673-74. In addition, as the court noted, " 
[proponents of a mediator privilege must reckon 
with the important right of litigants to obtain all 
available evidence, a right that arguably is 
paramount to some of the interests relied upon to 
justify immunizing mediators from compulsory 
disclosure." FN12 Id., at 674-75. Accordingly, the 
court concluded, u[w]hen a litigant seeks to assert a 
privilege not recognized in the common law, the 
court must test it by balancing the policies behind 
the privilege against those favoring disclosure." Id. 
FN11. The court noted that, by " ' 
mediator privilege' the court refers to a 
privilege invocable by the mediator, with 
or without the consent of a client or other 
mediation participant." Smith v. Smith, 154 
F.R.D. 661, 670 n. 11 (N.D.Tex. 1994). 
FN 12. The court added, "certain of the 
reasons on which advocates of a mediator 
privilege stand are subject to question. 
There are those who challenge the validity 
of concerns regarding an appearance of 
mediator impartiality ... Furthermore, one 
can arguably question the validity of 
predictions of a shortage of 
mediators-including able ones-if a 
mediator privilege is not adopted." 
(Citations omitted.) Smith v. Smith, supra, 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Conn. L. Rptr. 852 
154 F.R.D. at 675. 
*11 In the present case, it would not serve the 
policy considerations of encouraging settlement by 
mediation or the policy favoring disclosure if a 
party was able to use mediation proceedings to 
engage in behavior that is prejudicial to the rights of 
other parties and then use the mediation privilege to 
insulate himself or herself from liability. See Avary 
v. Bank of America, N.A., 72 S.W.3d 779, 800 
(Tex.Civ.App.2002), cert, denied, 2005 Tex. 
LEXIS 375 (Tex.2005). Moreover, such conduct is 
counter to the policy of ensuring that "agreements 
reached during mediation are enforced, thereby 
upholding the policy of judicial economy, the very 
reason mediation is encouraged." Sharon Motor 
Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. at 753. 
IV 
In these circumstances, the interest of justice 
outweighs the need for confidentiality. The court 
grants plaintiffs motion for order # 228. The scope 
of the testimony shall be limited to the issues set 
forth in counts 3-7 of plaintiffs amended complaint 
dated July 16,2001. 
SO ORDERED. 
Conn.Super.,2006. 
Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 696320 
(Conn.Super.), 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 852 
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